

CONTROLLING TRAVEL: DEPORTATION, ISLANDS AND THE REGULATION OF SENATORIAL MOBILITY IN THE AUGUSTAN PRINCIPATE*

In her recent article in this journal, Sarah T. Cohen argued that the Roman practice of *deportatio ad insulam* – the punishment of exile to an island so commonly found in Roman law from the Imperial Era – had as its genesis Augustus' banishment of his daughter Julia to the island of Pandateria (and a number of her lovers to other islands) in 2 B.C.¹ According to Cohen, Augustus created island exile specifically to deal with the crisis caused by Julia's misbehaviour, and his action subsequently created an entirely new type of punishment in Roman law. While Cohen is certainly correct that Julia's banishment is a critical milestone in the development of island exile, there are several reasons to believe that Augustus' thinking on the nature and purpose of exile had already begun evolving long before he sent Julia to Pandateria. Although no judicial sentence of island exile is attested before 2 B.C.,² the ideas underlying *deportatio ad insulam* derived more fundamentally from an earlier and broader imperial policy – the regulation of elite travel. From the earliest years of his rule Augustus sought to control the physical location and movement of Rome's aristocracy as a means of consolidating his control over the empire, and the development of *deportatio ad insulam* should be seen as an extension of this practice. Indeed, the regulation of elite travel and island exile must be studied as corollary practices, since each one sheds light on the other. Historians who have previously studied exile under Augustus (including Cohen) tend to treat the subject as an isolated or independent aspect of Roman law, and therefore have been concerned predominantly with the legal and administrative aspects of its development. This paper will take the opposite approach and will examine island exile as part of a larger and more comprehensive Augustan policy. While Augustus had the raw power necessary to subdue any potential rival, he preferred to avoid such open use of force by instead limiting the aristocracy's ability to organize and mobilize resistance against him. The regulation of elite travel – including that of those members of the elite in exile – enabled Augustus to use geography instead of military force

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¹ S.T. Cohen, 'Augustus, Julia and the development of exile *ad insulam*', *CQ* 58 (2008), 206–17.

² Pliny (*HN* 7.36) and Gellius (*NA* 9.4.15) mention the exile to an island in 171 B.C. of a woman said to have spontaneously changed genders, and her removal was ordered by the priests for purposes of purification. Cohen correctly identifies this episode (if historical) as a religious – and not legal – action, which has no bearing on the present topic.

to weaken the aristocracy by reducing and monitoring their ability to draw upon important sources of social, political, and military power throughout the Empire.

I. ISLANDS AND EXILE IN THE AUGUSTAN PRINCIPATE

By the end of Augustus' lifetime there were two common forms of banishment used in the Roman legal system: *relegatio* and *deportatio*.³ *Relegatio* was the less severe of the two forms, requiring the offender to remain outside of Rome and Italy, although further constraints might be added.⁴ This form of imposed exile was a clear development from Republican tradition, which had allowed its citizens voluntary exile as an alternative to more serious legal penalties: Cn. Fulvius Flaccus retired to Tarquinia in 211 B.C. to escape a charge of *perduellio*, C. Porcius Cato retired to Tarraco in 109 B.C. after being convicted under the *lex Mamilia* for inciting Jugurtha to revolt, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus retired to Rhodes in 100 B.C. to avoid a heavy fine for refusing to take an oath supporting Saturninus' land distribution law, P. Rutilius Rufus retired to Mytilene in 92 B.C. to avoid fines imposed by his conviction for extortion, and T. Annius Milo retired to Massilia in

³ *Deportatio* would not become the technical term for this type of exile until the second century A.D. (P. Garnsey, *Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire* [Oxford, 1970], 113), but for convenience and clarity the term will be used in this article. A formal discussion of the history and development of Roman practices of exile is beyond the scope of the current work, but see L.M. Hartmann, *De Exilio apud Romanos inde ab Initio Bellorum civilium usque ad Severi Alexandri Principatum* (Berlin, 1887), 8–32; M. Braginton, 'Exile under the Roman emperors', *CJ* 39 (1944), 391–407; G. Crifò, *Ricerche sull' 'exilium' nel periodo repubblicano* (Milan, 1961), 77–191; R.A. Bauman, *The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate* (Johannesburg, 1967), 198–206; Garnsey (this note), 111–22; H. Jolowicz and B. Nicholas, *Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law* (Cambridge, 1972), 307–8, 403; S. Jameson, 'Augustus and Agrippa Postumus', *Historia* 24 (1975), 287–314; E.L. Grasmück, *Exilium: Untersuchungen zur Verbannung in der Antike* (Paderborn, 1978), 62–145; B.M. Levick, 'Poena Legis Maiestatis', *Historia* 28 (1979), 358–79; J.P.V.D. Balsdon, *Romans and Aliens* (London, 1979), 97–115; E. Doblhofer, *Exil und Emigration* (Darmstadt, 1987), 49–59; R.A. Bauman, *Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome* (London and New York, 1996), 9–20, 26–34; G. Amiotti, 'Primi casi di relegazione e di deportazione insulare nel mondo romano', in M. Sordi (ed.), *Coercizione e mobilità umana nel mondo antico* (Milan, 1995), 245–58; S.T. Cohen, 'Exile in the political language of the Early Principate' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chicago, 2002), 1–84; S. Bingham, 'Life on an island: a brief study of places of exile in the first century AD', *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History* 11 (2003), 376–400; E.H. Rocovich, 'Exile in Roman life and thought from Augustus to Constantine' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Chapel Hill, 2004), 13–93; G.P. Kelly *A History of Exile in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge, 2006), *passim*; Cohen (n. 1), 206–17; Y. Rivière, 'L'Italie, les îles et le continent: Recherches sur l'exil et l'administration du territoire impérial (I^{er} – III^e siècles)', in C. Brélaz and P. Ducrey (edd.), *Sécurité collective et ordre public dans les sociétés anciennes* (Geneva, 2008), 261–310.

⁴ Tacitus, for example, provides numerous examples: *Ann.* 6.18.1–2, 12.8.1, 12.22.2, 14.28.2, 15.71.5, 16.33.2. On occasion, an individual (often a woman) might only be banned from the city of Rome (*Tac. Ann.* 2.50.3, 6.30.2, 6.49.2). Additional constraints might include forbidding condemned individuals access to other provinces in addition to Italy (such as Manlius, convicted of adultery with Augustus' grand-niece Appuleia, who was banned from Italy and Africa [*Tac. Ann.* 2.50.3]) or the sentencing of an individual to spend his exile in a specific location (such as Ovid, who was ordered to live in Tomis on the Black Sea [*Ovid, Trist.* 2.137: *quippe relegatus, non exul, dicor in illo*]). It was also not uncommon for groups of 'undesirables' to be ordered out of Italy in a similar fashion: *Tac. Ann.* 2.32.3 (astrologers and magicians), 4.14.3 (actors); *Gell.* 15.11.3–5; *Dio Cass.* 65.13.1 (philosophers).

52 B.C. to escape punishment for the murder of Clodius.⁵ Indeed, Polybius singled out for special praise the Roman practice of allowing its citizens to escape severe judicial penalties – including execution – by going into voluntary exile.⁶ Although their choice of exile was voluntary, such individuals were usually condemned *in absentia* and barred from returning to Roman territory on pain of death (*aquae et ignis interdictio*).⁷ Thus their removal from Rome was voluntary, but their return was prohibited by the people.⁸ Exiled citizens merely had to take themselves beyond the reach of Roman law, and Polybius notes that – in his day – exiles from Rome found safety in friendly but independent states like Naples, Praeneste and Tibur.⁹ In the early Republic aristocrats such as Camillus or Flaccus could retire to Italian states that did not fall under Roman jurisdiction, but when the enfranchisement of the Italians following the Social War brought them under the aegis of Roman law, exiled Romans had to seek refuge outside of Italy in order to escape the reach of Roman jurisdiction.¹⁰ As a result, banishment came to mean self-removal from Italy, but the rest of the world – including Rome's provinces – remained available to exiles. Fugitives would normally seek citizenship – and therefore legal protection – in their new residence, thereby forfeiting their Roman citizenship.¹¹ Since the expense and effort of such relocation could be considerable,

⁵ Flaccus: Livy 26.3.12; Cato: Cic. *Brut.* 128, *Balb.* 28 (on the *lex Mamilia* see *MRR* 1.546); Metellus: Livy *Per.* 69; Plut. *Mar.* 29.7–8 (he later moved to Tralles [Val. Max. 4.1.13]); Rutilius: Cic. *Rab. Post.* 27 (cf. Vell. Pat. 2.13.2, Val. Max. 2.10.5 and 6.4.4); Milo: Asc. 54C; Dio Cass. 40.54.3–4. For a complete list of Republican exiles from 220 to 44 B.C., see Kelly (n. 3), 161–219.

⁶ Polyb. 6.14.7: καὶ γίνεται τι περὶ ταύτην τὴν χρεῖαν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἄξιον ἐπαίνου καὶ μνήμης. τοῖς γὰρ θανάτου κρινομένοις, ἐπὰν καταδικάζωνται, δίδωσι τὴν ἐξουσίαν τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἀπαλλάττεσθαι φανερώς, κἂν ἔτι μία λείπηται φυλὴ τῶν ἐπικυρουσῶν τὴν κρίσιν ἀψηφοφόρητος, ἐκούσιον ἑαυτοῦ καταγνόντα φυγαδεῖαν ('among them there is something about this practice [of conducting capital trials] that is worthy of praise and mention. Their custom gives the right to those being tried on a capital charge to depart openly upon being condemned – so long as one tribe of those having a share in the judgment has not yet voted – thereby passing a voluntary sentence of exile upon themselves'). Crifò (n. 3), 103–7, 311–12 considered exile to be a fundamental legal right of Roman citizens, but Kelly (n. 3), 20–5 argues that it was merely custom, backed by the considerable weight of the *mos maiorum*.

⁷ Indicated by their interdiction from water and fire in Roman territory, which authorized anyone to kill the condemned with impunity. Bauman (n. 3, [1996]), 12 calls interdiction a '... conditional death sentence. If the accused remained in Rome or Roman Italy he was liable to be killed; but if he went into exile he was safe' and argues (27) that it '... made [the wrongdoer] an outlaw liable to be killed by anyone with impunity'. Roman law did not impose exile upon condemned individuals until 63 B.C. (see below).

⁸ One exception to this rule was the consular prerogative of *relegatio*, by which a consul could use his *coercitio* to banish an individual from Rome, although the force behind such relegation expired when the consul left office. For example, in 58 B.C. the consul Gabinius commanded by edict that L. Lamia be removed at least 200 miles from Rome for attempting to intervene for Cicero (Cic. *Sest.* 29). See Garnsey (n. 3), 115–16, 119, who also points out that a *paterfamilias* had the same authority over those under his *manus*.

⁹ Polyb. 6.14.8: ἔστι δ' ἀσφάλεια τοῖς φεύγουσιν ἐν τε τῇ Νεαπολιτῶν καὶ Πραηνεστίνων, ἔτι δὲ Τιβουρίων πόλει, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις, πρὸς ἃς ἔχουσιν ὄρκια ('there is refuge for these exiles in the territory of Naples and Praeneste, and also in the city of Tibur and other cities who have a treaty [with Rome]'). See Kelly (n. 3), 231–2, who points out that an exile '... would have sought refuge in a *civitas libera*, a state independent of Roman jurisdiction'.

¹⁰ Kelly (n. 3), 93 and 102.

¹¹ Cic. *Balb.* 28: *duarum civitatum civis noster esse iure civili nemo potest; non esse huius civitatis, qui se alii civitati dicarit, potest*. See also Balsdon (n. 3), 97, who points out that – until the Late Republic – Romans who accepted citizenship in another state automatically forfeited their Roman citizenship. A common aspect of early treaties (*foedera*) made between

voluntary exile was normally a practice of the aristocracy, although we can certainly imagine that poorer citizens charged with capital offences simply disappeared from Rome, never to be heard from again.¹² Once out of Roman territory, exiles were normally free to travel to whatever location offered the most attractive lifestyle,¹³ where they were under the jurisdiction of the Roman governor if they fled to a province,¹⁴ or the local authorities if they exited the provinces altogether.¹⁵ Such exile remained a voluntary alternative to harsher penalties until the consulship of Cicero in 63 B.C., when a *lex Tullia* first established exile for a ten-year period as a standard legal sentence for certain crimes, although exiled citizens continued to enjoy the same freedom of movement once they were beyond Roman jurisdiction.¹⁶ During his principate Augustus made considerable use of this type of *relegatio* to remove criminals and other troublesome people from Italy, but he seems to have distinguished between individuals who were permanently banished (and therefore subjected to interdiction) and those who were only banished for a period of time (and therefore not subjected to interdiction). Romans would have recognized both forms of *relegatio* as being perfectly consistent with their long tradition of exile, even if that tradition emphasized its voluntary nature.

The second form of exile in use by A.D. 14 – *deportatio ad insulam* – was an unprecedented innovation that was established in the reign of Augustus. It was far harsher than *relegatio*, since it entailed interdiction, loss of citizenship, confiscation of property and permanent banishment to a small and usually unpleasant (by aristocratic standards) island.¹⁷ There is evidence that Augustus (Octavian at the time)

Rome and other states was the *ius exilii*, whereby both sides agreed to grant admittance to each other's exiles (see J.S. Reid, 'Some aspects of local autonomy in the Roman Empire', *The Cambridge Historical Journal* 1.2 [1924], 121; Crifò [n. 3], esp. 125–92; D.W. Baronowski, 'Roman treaties with communities of citizens', *CQ* 38 [1988], 173; Kelly [n. 3], 54–65). A famous example is P. Rutilius Rufus, who went into exile in 93/92 B.C. and was welcomed and given citizenship in Smyrna (Cic. *Balb.* 28, Tac. *Ann.* 4.43.5). Likewise, C. Porcius Cato (cos. 114) acquired citizenship in Tarraco in Spain, where his family had clients and connections (Cic. *Balb.* 28, see Kelly [n. 3], 171).

¹² See Garnsey (n. 3), 120 and Balsdon (n. 3), 112.

¹³ In the Late Republic, Greek states that offered a high quality of life were particularly popular among exiled Romans, including Athens, Delos, Massilia, Mytilene, Rhodes and Smyrna (see Kelly [n. 3], 161–219 for references). Kelly (69–81) notes that exiles normally selected their new home by the quality of life it offered, but when the political turmoil of the Late Republic increased the possibility that sentences would be reversed and exiles recalled, those who were optimistic about their chances for recall tended to select residences closer to Italy from which they could communicate with allies and work for their return.

¹⁴ In the provinces, exiles were under the jurisdiction of the governor and not the courts of Rome. So all of Clodius' rabble-rousing could not prevent Cn. Plancius, quaestor to the governor of Macedonia, from receiving Cicero and offering him shelter while in exile (Cic. *Planc.* 98–9, cf. *Att.* 3.14, *Fam.* 14.1.3). Likewise, Sextilius as governor of Africa refused to admit the fugitive Marius into the province, but chose to turn a blind eye to his occupation of Cercina (an island just off the coast of Africa) and to his recruitment of soldiers from Africa (Plut. *Mar.* 40.3–41.2).

¹⁵ Marius and his son were initially welcomed by the king of Numidia following their exile (although he later turned against them) (Plut. *Mar.* 40.5–6), Attidius found refuge in Pontus with Mithridates (App. *Mith.* 90), and Pompey expected to receive refuge in Egypt following his defeat by Caesar (he also considered Parthia as a potential sanctuary) (Plut. *Pomp.* 76–9).

¹⁶ Cic. *Mur.* 47, 89; Dio Cass. 37.29.1; A.H.M. Jones, *The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate* (Totowa, 1972), 57; Balsdon (n. 3), 104; Levick (n. 3), 371. Kelly (n. 3), 43–4 points out that this punishment did not include interdiction.

¹⁷ These are the conditions in its fully developed form (*Dig.* 48.22.1–18). The present article is concerned only with the use of islands to hold exiles, but for discussion of the terminology and legal foundations of *deportatio* see Hartmann (n. 3), 24; Braginton (n. 3), 391–407; Jolowicz

was tinkering with the Republican traditions of exile even before he became the sole ruler, as indicated by his decision in 36 B.C. to banish his deposed triumviral colleague M. Aemilius Lepidus to the small Italian town of Circei.¹⁸ This was a considerable break with the Roman tradition of allowing a defeated political enemy to slink off quietly into ignominious exile wherever he wished, but Lepidus was the *pontifex maximus* and had wielded tremendous power and influence, and Augustus may have been nervous about granting such a man too much liberty in exile.¹⁹ This political problem was solved with geography: Lepidus was restricted to the small (and somewhat remote) town of Circei, where he was near enough to be watched closely but far enough away to be out of sight unless wanted.²⁰ It is possible that this solution was inspired by Julius Caesar's proposal to confine the Catilinarian conspirators in fortified Italian towns, thereby reducing their ability to cause harm in the future.²¹ But whatever his motive or intention, Augustus seems to have been thinking about ways to control defeated but still influential rivals years before he achieved sole rule.

Augustus' thinking on exile evolved even further when he was confronted with the shocking and unacceptable behaviour of his daughter Julia in A.D. 2. Rather than banishing her from Italy (*relegatio*) or confining her like Lepidus in an Italian town, Augustus chose to ship her off to the island of Pandateria where he intended to lock her away for life (although he later changed her sentence to perpetual confinement in Rhégium).²² The emperor likewise banished many of her lovers to islands, although only the destination of Sempronius Gracchus is known: the island of Cercina off the coast of Africa.²³ Augustus evidently liked his solution for punishing Julia's indiscretions, because he inflicted similar punishments on other troublesome relatives: in A.D. 7 he banished his grandson Agrippa Postumus to the island of Planasia, and in A.D. 8 he banished his granddaughter Julia to the island of Trimerus.²⁴ While this stringent form of exile was initially reserved for peccant members of the imperial house, in A.D. 12 Augustus decided to widen its use and decreed that all exiled persons whose relegation had been confirmed by interdiction (that is, had been permanently banished) should be confined on a

and Nicholas (n. 3), 403; Grasmück (n. 3), 64–109; Bauman (n. 3, [1996]), 28; Bingham (n. 3), 377–8.

¹⁸ Suet. *Aug.* 16.4.

¹⁹ During the Republic political competition between aristocrats was frequently resolved by the 'losing' party going into voluntary exile (a sort of informal, voluntary ostracism), such as Scipio Africanus in 187 (or 184) B.C. (Livy 38.50.4–55.8, 58.1); Metellus Numidicus in 100 B.C. (Cic. *Dom.* 82, Liv. *Per.* 69, Plut. *Mar.* 29, App. *B Civ.* 1.31–2); Cicero in 58 B.C. (Cic. *Planc.* 73, Plut. *Cic.* 31.4–6, Dio Cass. 38.17.4); and T. Annius Milo in 52 B.C. (Asc. 54C, Dio Cass. 40.53.2, 40.54.3–4, 40.55.1). Kelly (n. 3), 13 argues that exile acted '... as a "safety valve" to prevent public disputes among elite citizens from turning into civil conflict'.

²⁰ Indeed, Augustus seems to have enjoyed periodically summoning Lepidus to attend meetings of the senate where the *princeps* would humiliate the *pontifex maximus* by asking his opinion last of all the consuls – a significant insult to such a senior senator (Dio Cass. 54.15.4–5).

²¹ Sall. *Cat.* 51.43; Plut. *Caes.* 7.8–9.

²² Vell. Pat. 2.100.5; Tac. *Ann.* 1.53.1; Suet. *Aug.* 65.1–3, *Tib.* 50.1; Dio Cass. 55.10.14.

²³ Julia's lovers: Vell. Pat. 2.100.5; Sen. *Clem.* 1.10.3; Tac. *Ann.* 3.24.2; Dio Cass. 55.10.15 (for discussion, see Bauman [n. 3, (1967)], 198–206 and A.J. Woodman and R.H. Martin, *The Annals of Tacitus Book 3* [Cambridge, 1996], 225–9); Sempronius Gracchus: Tac. *Ann.* 1.53.4, 4.13.3.

²⁴ Agrippa: Tac. *Ann.* 1.3.4, 1.5.1, 2.39.1; Suet. *Aug.* 65.4; Dio Cass. 55.32.2, 57.3.6 (for discussion, see Jameson [n. 3], 287–314, esp. 302–3); Julia the Younger: Tac. *Ann.* 4.71.3; Suet. *Aug.* 65.1–3.

specific set of islands.²⁵ In doing this, the emperor established in law a principle that may have existed in practice for some time – that Rome had two categories of banishment: *relegatio* and *deportatio ad insulam*. In very little time *deportatio* to an island became a normal feature of Roman law, one of several possible punishments that might be inflicted upon elite members of society (eventually known as *honestiores*). It is possible that this innovation in exile was nothing more than a logistical convenience for Rome's judicial system, but several aspects of this new form of exile suggest that a deeper imperial agenda was being pursued.

This agenda is suggested by Appendix Two, which presents a list of islands known to have been used or suggested for holding deportees under the Julio-Claudian dynasty. While the exile of Julia the Elder may have influenced Augustus' policy of elite banishment, the data presented in this appendix indicates that the deportation of Roman aristocracy was very different in nature and conception from Augustus' punishment of his own family members. To begin with, members of the imperial house were all banished to small islands right off the coast of Italy as the Julias and Agrippa Postumus had been: Tiberius banished Agrippina the Elder to Pandateria and Nero Caesar to Pontia, Caligula sent his sisters to the Pontian Islands, Claudius recalled his niece Julia Livilla only to banish her to Pandateria, and Nero banished Octavia to Pandateria (see Map One).²⁶ Furthermore, these individuals were not left to their own devices on their islands, but rather were kept under guard and carefully watched, allowing the emperor to monitor closely his relatives' activities and visitors (if they received any).²⁷ In some of these cases, the emperor may have used his *patria potestas* to punish those family members under his *manus*, although he also had recourse to other legal procedures to remove these individuals to islands.²⁸ We may guess that the emperors chose these particular islands because they were simultaneously remote and accessible: they were physically detached from Italy, and therefore remote enough to keep members of the imperial house securely and uncomfortably incarcerated out of the public eye,²⁹

²⁵ Dio Cass. 56.27.2–3 (quoted in full below). Presumably, exiles who had been relegated without interdiction were not affected by this increased penalty, and thus Ovid continued to live in Tomis on the Black Sea, where he died a few years after the emperor.

²⁶ Agrippina the Elder: Tac. *Ann.* 14.63.2; Suet. *Tib.* 53.2, *Calig.* 10.1; Nero Drusus: Suet. *Tib.* 54.2; Caligula's sisters: Dio Cass. 59.3.6, 59.22.8; Julia Livilla: Tac. *Ann.* 14.63.2; Dio Cass. 60.8.4–5; Octavia: Tac. *Ann.* 14.63.1; Suet. *Ner.* 35.2.

²⁷ See particularly the descriptions of the guard around Agrippa Postumus (Tac. *Ann.* 1.6.1–2; Suet. *Aug.* 65.4, *Tib.* 22; Dio Cass. 57.3.6). No guards are specifically named around the Julias, but the number of restrictions and deprivations placed upon Julia the Elder probably required enforcement by guards (Suet. *Aug.* 65.3, *Tib.* 50). Soldiers are also known to have accompanied Octavia (Tac. *Ann.* 14.60.4–5), as well as Agrippina the Elder and her son Nero Caesar (Suet. *Tib.* 64).

²⁸ Bauman (n. 3 [1967]), 198–206 suggests that Julia the Elder's punishment was determined by the adultery law of that time, but Woodman (in Woodman and Martin [n. 23], 225–9) argues that Augustus punished Julia for violating his *patria maiestas*, which was theoretically a private matter but the emperor's unique position as *pater patriae* gave the crime a public dimension and thus rendered the offence – and therefore the punishment – more severe. Jameson (n. 3), 302 argues that Agrippa Postumus was relegated in A.D. 6 by virtue of Augustus' *patria potestas*. See also Cohen (n. 1), 206–17 and (n. 3), 43–7, 61–2. On the legal charges used to banish other family members, see above (n. 3).

²⁹ The seclusion of these islands was particularly useful if the prisoner was popular in Rome and his or her imprisonment a social or political embarrassment to the emperor. This was particularly true of female prisoners: Augustus was enraged by popular petitions for the recall of his daughter Julia (Suet. *Aug.* 65.3), Tiberius' popularity suffered by his banishment of Agrippina



MAP ONE: Islands off Italy used to hold exiled members of the imperial family.

but their proximity to Italy, to the watchful gaze of the emperor and his praetorian guards, and to the fleet at Misenum, rendered escape virtually impossible.³⁰ Indeed, the closeness of these islands even allowed the emperor to visit his exiled relations if he wished, or to have them quickly executed if necessary.³¹ Finally, by all accounts the conditions on these islands were very unpleasant, either because they were naturally devoid of luxuries or because the emperor's guards maintained their captives with only the barest of necessities.³² Like an ancient Alcatraz, these

the Elder (Tac. *Ann.* 14.63.2), and Nero's divorce and exile of Octavia aroused vocal and widespread complaint among the people (Tac. *Ann.* 14.60.1–63.3).

³⁰ Members of the imperial family – especially those disaffected with the reigning emperor – were valuable commodities to those wishing for revolution. Suetonius reports the foiled plan to liberate Julia the Elder and Agrippa Postumus from their prison islands and deliver them to the legions (Aug. 19.2, cf. *Tib.* 53.2), and Tacitus records a similar plot to free Agrippa Postumus (Tac. *Ann.* 2.39.1). Loyalty to the imperial house (even exiled members) was strong: an imposter posing as the deceased Agrippa Postumus appeared in the provinces and caused considerable disturbance by gathering crowds of supporters (Tac. *Ann.* 2.39.1–40.3; Dio Cass. 57.16.3). See Jameson (n. 3), 289.

³¹ Tacitus (*Ann.* 1.5.1–2) reports that Augustus was rumoured to have visited Agrippa Postumus on Planasia, and the rapid execution of Agrippa following Augustus' own death demonstrates that those incarcerated on Planasia (and other similar prison islands) were firmly under the control of the imperial house. Although Tacitus is usually interpreted as indicating that Augustus or Tiberius ordered Agrippa's death, A.J. Woodman (*Tacitus Reviewed* [Oxford, 1998], 23–32) argues that Tacitus is really presenting Tiberius as ignorant of the execution, which was carried out independently by a centurion who assumed the new emperor would give such an order. In either scenario, however, Agrippa was completely at the mercy of the emperor and his soldiers.

³² Agrippina the Elder was said to have been beaten viciously (she lost an eye as a result) and to have died of starvation in exile (Suet. *Tib.* 53.2), Julia the Elder was stripped of all

were very much prison islands that provided secure incarceration, harsh living conditions and proximity to (but separation from) Italy.

On the other hand, the terms that Augustus laid down for the deportation of other, non-imperial aristocrats indicate that he intended them to experience a very different type of exile. Cassius Dio wrote:

ἐπειδὴ τε συχνοὶ φυγάδες οἱ μὲν ἔξω τῶν τόπων ἐς οὓς ἐξωρίσθησαν τὰς διατριβάς ἐποιούντο, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἀβρότερον διήγον, ἀπηγόρευσε μηδένα πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος εἰρχθέντα μήτε ἐν ἡπείρῳ διατρίβειν μήτε ἐν νήσῳ τῶν ὅσαι ἔλαττον τετρακοσίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἡπείρου σταδίων ἀπέχουσι, πλὴν Κῶ τε καὶ Ῥόδου Σάμου [Boissevain; *σαρδοῦς ms.*] τε καὶ Λέσβου, ταύτας γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως μόνας ὑπέξείλετο. ἐκεῖνά τε οὖν αὐτοῖς προσέταξε, καὶ τὸ μήτε περαιούσθαι ποι ἄλλοσε ...

Since many exiles were residing outside of those areas to which they had been banished and others were leading a very luxurious life in the assigned places, [Augustus] decreed that no one banned from fire and water was to live on the mainland or on one of the islands less than 400 stades [= 50 miles] away from the mainland, except Cos, Rhodes, Samos and Lesbos; I do not know why he excluded these islands alone. And furthermore he commanded these exiles not to cross over the sea to any other place ...³³

This decision was prompted by his discovery that many banished individuals had left their designated places of exile, which indicates that – even before this edict – the emperor had been banishing Romans to specific places.³⁴ Ovid is the most famous example of this development: the vehement hatred he expressed for Tomis strongly suggests that he had not chosen the town for himself, but had been specifically sent there by Augustus. We do not know when Augustus began limiting the movement of Romans in exile, but it is possible that Sempronius Gracchus' exile to Cercina in A.D. 2 was only one example of a policy that had been in place long before that year, and the fact that Julia's other lovers were also banished to islands supports this possibility. Indeed, when Augustus received word of the destruction of Varus' army in the Teutoburg Forest in A.D. 9, one of his first reactions was to remove the members of his German bodyguard to islands until the emergency had passed.³⁵ While this action may have been a sudden inspiration, it is perhaps more likely that Augustus had long been using islands to hold potentially dangerous (or particularly annoying) persons, and Julia's lovers were merely the first such exiles to be named in our sources. Regardless of how early the practice was adopted, Augustus was the author of the two-tiered system of banishment that is well

remaining property by Tiberius (Suet. *Tib.* 50.1), Julia the Younger, who had been dependent upon her grandmother Livia for subsistence, was denied even this support after Livia's death (Tac. *Ann.* 4.71), and Germanicus' children Nero Caesar, Drusus Caesar and Julia Livilla were all starved to death while imprisoned on islands (Suet. *Tib.* 53–4; Sen. *Apocol.* 10.4). Bingham (n. 3), 385–8 points out that the existence of several large and well-outfitted imperial residences on many of these islands may have ameliorated the conditions of exile, but of course we have no way of knowing to what degree exiled members of the imperial family were permitted to enjoy the luxuries provided by such accommodation.

³³ Dio Cass. 56.27.2–3. P.M. Swan, *The Augustan Succession* (Oxford, 2004), 288 believes that this passage of Dio '... no doubt originated in a senate decree whose wording, with its legal distinctions and qualifications, is reflected in our text ...', and he argues against Garnsey's suggestion ([n. 3], 112 n. 5) that this passage presents '... an amalgam of regulations issued at several times, and tied only loosely to AD 12'.

³⁴ Garnsey (n. 3), 112 n. 5 and Levick (n. 3), 376 also make this observation.

³⁵ Dio Cass. 56.23.4; Suet. *Aug.* 49.1.

attested later: *relegatio* that required temporary removal *from* Italy and *deportatio ad insulam* that imposed permanent exile *to* a designated island.

At the same time, there were some very significant differences between the exile of imperial and non-imperial elite persons. In addition to restricting exiled individuals to islands in A.D. 12, Augustus also instituted new regulations that established the conditions of exile and limited the wealth and possessions an individual could possess in his or her new home:

ἐκεῖνά τε οὖν αὐτοῖς προσέταξε, καὶ τὸ μήτε περαιοῦσθαι ποι ἄλλοσε, μήτε πλοῖα πλείω φορτικοῦ τε ἐνὸς χιλιοφόρου καὶ κωπήρων δύο κεκτήσθαι, μήτε δούλους ἢ καὶ ἀπελευθέρους ὑπὲρ εἴκοσι χρῆσθαι, μήτ' οὐσίαν ὑπὲρ δώδεκα καὶ ἡμίσειαν μυριάδα ἔχειν, τιμωρηθῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς τι παρὰ ταῦτα συμπράξαντάς σφισιν ἐπαπειλήσας.

And furthermore he commanded these exiles not to cross over the sea to any other place, nor to own more ships than one 1,000-amphora cargo vessel and two ships furnished with oars, nor to make use of more than twenty slaves or freedmen, nor to own property valued above 125,000 drachmas [= 500,000 sesterces], and he threatened to punish both the exiles themselves and any others who lend aid to them in violation of these decrees.³⁶

While this certainly represented a significant loss to the greatest aristocrats, these conditions seem very generous, especially when viewed alongside the far harsher treatment the emperor meted out to his own family. Considering that a sentence of *deportatio ad insulam* was second only to death in severity under Roman law, deportees were permitted to retain a high level of wealth and creature comforts; Augustus' limitation of exiles to 500,000 HS in property is well above the minimum property requirement for membership in the equestrian order (400,000 HS), and although this may have felt like hardship to wealthy senators, it was more than sufficient to afford a comfortable living in exile, especially on a provincial island.³⁷ Indeed, P. Suillius reportedly lived in great comfort and ease while in exile, Avillius Flaccus purchased a farm on Andros and Juvenal lamented the shamelessness of Marius Priscus, who – having been condemned for extortion – spent his exile in careless drinking.³⁸ Seneca remarks that exiles of his day retained more wealth in banishment than leading senatorial families had ever owned in the Republic.³⁹ Furthermore, the emperor's decree permitted exiles to own ships and even a cargo vessel, enabling them to engage in trade and to import whatever necessities and

³⁶ Dio Cass. 56.27.3. See Swan (n. 33), 288–90.

³⁷ Kelly (n. 3), 137 has suggested that this cash limitation was established to force wealthy Romans to leave much of their property in Rome where it could be confiscated by the state and the emperor. See Dig. 48.22.1 [Pomponius] where Trajan condemns the avarice of the traditional practice whereby the imperial treasury acquired the property of relegated persons.

³⁸ P. Suillius: *ferebaturque copiosa et molli vita secretum illud toleravisse* (Tac. Ann. 13.43.5); Avillius Flaccus: Philo, *Flacc.* 168; Marius Priscus: *exul ab octava Marius bibit et fruitur dis | iratis; at tu victrix, provincia, ploras* (Juv. 1.49–50). Lollia Paulina, who was only exiled from Italy, was permitted to take with her five million sesterces, an amount that exceeded the maximum established by Augustus and therefore probably represents a special exception granted because of her previous relationship to the emperor (Tac. Ann. 12.22.2–3).

³⁹ Sen. *ad Helv.* 12.4: ... *eo temporum luxuria prolapsa est ut maius viaticum exulum sit quam olim patrimonium principum fuit* ('... in these times luxury has progressed so far that the allowance of exiles is greater than the inheritance of leading men once was').

luxuries they wanted.⁴⁰ Caligula as emperor would order the execution of many exiles in order to acquire their money, indicating his belief that aristocratic exiles were a source of considerable wealth.⁴¹ Presumably they could also receive friends and family as visitors, and many were accompanied into exile by wives or family.⁴² On the whole, existence under these conditions would have been far more pleasant than that of Julia the Elder, who was specifically forbidden all luxuries, including wine, and all male company.⁴³ Indeed, the fact that exiles were permitted to reside on the beautiful, sophisticated and rich islands of Cos, Lesbos, Rhodes and Samos demonstrates that the emperor was not trying to subject them to particularly harsh conditions. While some exiled aristocrats may have fallen into poverty and become dependent upon support from family and friends,⁴⁴ many could and did live in wealth and comfort, indicating that Augustus was not concerned to punish aristocratic exiles with the poverty and misery he inflicted upon members of his own house.

Second, although exiles were instructed to remain on their islands, Augustus does not seem to have attempted to confine them as he did his own relatives. Whereas the Julias and Agrippa Postumus were closely guarded and watched, the emperor's edict suggests that the majority of exiled aristocrats were not placed under direct guard, but rather were expected to live in designated places on their own recognition. Indeed, his permitting to them of long-distance boats demonstrates that he did not try to eliminate their means of escape. While the emperor may have expected local magistrates to act as wardens, the fact that by A.D. 12 a great number of exiles had left their assigned places of residence – apparently without permission or hindrance – and moved to other locations suggests that they had not been under guard or even closely monitored. When guards delivered the condemned Avillius Flaccus to Andros, they did nothing more than display him to the local inhabitants before leaving him there otherwise unattended.⁴⁵ While it is known that later emperors did indeed send soldiers to guard some select deportees, Augustus

⁴⁰ Swan (n. 33), 289–90 discusses the utility of a 1,000-amphora vessel and considers it rather small and less serviceable in the open sea than the larger merchant ships that carried between 10,000 and 50,000 *modii*.

⁴¹ Dio Cass. 59.18.1–5. D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton, 1950), 487 suggests that Roman exiles were sufficiently wealthy that they conferred substantial financial benefits to their new residences.

⁴² e.g. Sempronius Gracchus took his infant son into exile as a companion (Tac. *Ann.* 4.13.3), Seneca was accompanied by his friend Caesennius Maximus in Corsica (Mart. 7.44), Rubellius Plautus had the company of the Stoic philosopher C. Musonius Rufus (Tac. *Ann.* 14.59.1–2), two men exiled in A.D. 65 took their wives with them (Tac. *Ann.* 15.71.3), and Fannia twice followed her husband Helvidius Priscus into exile (Pliny, *Ep.* 7.19.4). When the philosopher Musonius was exiled to Gyaros, he was said to have regularly received visitors who came to talk and study with him (Philostr. *VA* 7.16). In the opening of his *Histories* Tacitus (1.3.1) praises the loyalty of those who accompanied family into exile: *non tamen adeo virtutum sterile saeculum ut non et bona exempla prodiderit. comitatae profugos liberos matres, secutae maritos in exilia coniuges ...* ('the age was not, however, so devoid of virtue that it did not produce good examples. Mothers were companions to exiled children, wives followed their husbands into exile ...').

⁴³ Suet. *Aug.* 65.3.

⁴⁴ e.g. Seneca mentions a father who provided for a son in exile (Sen. *Clem.* 1.15.2).

⁴⁵ Philo, *In Flacc.* 161. Basing his argument on the example of Flaccus, Hartmann (n. 3), 49–52 suggested that all exiles were kept under guard by local officials, but Braginton (n. 3), 395 argued against this, pointing out that agents often had to be sent from Rome when emperors wanted exiles executed, indicating that there were no wardens or other viable executioners with the prisoner.

does not seem to have thought such precautions to be generally necessary.⁴⁶ Without armed men to enforce the terms of banishment, exiled Romans could easily change their exile by moving elsewhere; during the civil war that followed Nero's death, two exiled senators – Octavius Sagitta and Antistius Sosianus – took the opportunity to leave their islands, apparently without encountering any obstacle.⁴⁷ By all indications their departure would have passed unnoticed, but they made the mistake of presenting themselves before Mucianus in expectation that the new emperor's lieutenant would pardon them, an expectation that was disappointed when they were ordered back to their islands. It would seem, therefore, that the only thing keeping most deportees from leaving their designated island was the threat of worse punishment if caught. We should not imagine that Augustus lacked the resources to guard exiles if he so wished. Indeed, his eventual discovery that many Romans had left their assigned places of exile demonstrates that there was some level of monitoring, but this was obviously minimal and had not prevented the deportees from leaving in the first place. Augustus simply did not make guarding exiles a priority, and Hadrian may have been reacting to these lax security measures when he decreed that relegated or banished individuals would suffer worse penalties if they violated the terms of their banishment.⁴⁸ In all, it would appear that Augustus did not banish aristocrats to islands because they were secure places of imprisonment, which is a distinct difference from the heavily guarded prison islands that held members of the imperial family.

Augustus' deportation of aristocrats deviated from his treatment of his relatives in a third way: the locations of the islands used for the two groups. While exiled members of the imperial house were kept on islands close at hand just off the coast of Italy, it seems to have been imperial policy to send non-imperial exiles far away from Italy, usually to small islands in the Aegean.⁴⁹ This suggests that Augustus (and his immediate successors) held two very different ideas about the geography of exile, and this difference was determined by the status of the offender. Yet, it is not at all clear why Aegean islands should be preferred for holding exiles, since – being situated far from Rome and in the middle of busy sea lanes – they lacked the security advantages that made Pandateria and other Italian islands so useful. While the use of Aegean islands suggests a policy of imprisonment and isolation, the terms of such exile indicate a general unconcern with security. Indeed, the general absence of guards, the distance from Italy, the ease of communication and their possession of wealth and boats made it impossible to prevent deportees from breaking their exile if they wished, which is surprising since secure island exile *was* possible and used for members of the imperial house. In short, Aegean islands did not offer secure detention as did Italy's prison islands, which suggests that those distant islands offered another advantage of which the emperor wished to avail himself.

⁴⁶ Caligula, for example, told one senator that he would be guarded in exile by as many soldiers as the senator had slaves (Dio Cass. 59.8.7).

⁴⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 4.44.1–3.

⁴⁸ *Dig.* 48.19.28.13 [Callistratus]. Hadrian declared those who violated the conditions of their sentence would face the next (more severe) penalty in the following sequence: temporary relegation, permanent relegation, relegation to a specific place (probably an island), deportation to an island, and execution.

⁴⁹ See Appendix Two. Some exceptions to this pattern are discussed below.

The great advantage of these Aegean islands was their ability to separate exiled aristocrats from all forms of military, political and social power; detainees were simultaneously disconnected from Italy as well as from the provinces. Indeed, removal from the provinces seems to have been the main purpose behind the development of island exile, a fact that is supported by a curious correlation: all of the islands that Augustus and his immediate successors used to hold exiled aristocrats seem to have been autonomous, such as Amorgos, Andros, Cythnos, Donusa, Gyaros and Seriphos, none of which constituted a province or were provably a part of a province until Vespasian or even Diocletian (see Map Two).⁵⁰ Cos, Lesbos, Rhodes and Samos – which belonged to the province of Asia by the time of Augustus – do not appear to have been actually used for deportees despite Augustus' inclusion of them in his decree; the only exile known to have taken up residence on one of these islands was swiftly removed and hauled back to Rome.⁵¹ Indeed, it is possible that Dio's editorial comment 'I do not know why he excluded these islands alone' should be taken to mean 'I do not know why Augustus named these four islands and yet did not permit exiles to live on them'.⁵² Furthermore, no exiles are known to have been deported to the island provinces of Crete, Cyprus or Sicily under the Julio-Claudians,⁵³ and the conditions on Corsica and Sardinia, as well as the treatment of those known to have been banished to those two islands, suggest that individuals sent there were not expected to survive long, making deportation to Corsica and Sardinia more of a death sentence than exile.⁵⁴ Juvenal – a great commentator on exile – never mentions islands within provinces as places of confinement, but emphasizes rather that the small islands of the Aegean were generally used for this purpose.⁵⁵ Indeed, it seems that the intention of Augustus' edict was to deny exiled aristocrats access to the provinces: by forbidding them to live on the mainland, the emperor separated them from the vast majority of the provinces,⁵⁶ and by requiring them to live on

⁵⁰ See Appendix One.

⁵¹ Junius Gallio on Lesbos (see Appendix Two, no. 20).


⁵² Dio Cass. 56.27.2, quoted in full above. Swan (n. 33), 289 notes this admission of ignorance but does not comment.

⁵³ See the case of Cassius Severus below.

⁵⁴ Corsica and Sardinia were famous for their bad climates and dangerous inhabitants (Sen. *Helv.* 6.5, 7.8, Strabo 5.2.7, R. Ash, *Tacitus Histories Book II* [Cambridge, 2007], 119), and Caracalla was said to have banished people to such places specifically so they would be killed by the wretched and unhealthy conditions (Dio Cass. 78.11.6), although J.-M. Claassen, *Displaced Persons* (Madison, 1999), 241–2 suggests that Corsica may not have been as bad as Seneca describes. Bingham (n. 3), 388–90 argues that Corsica and Sardinia were used when the emperor or senate wished (for some reason) to give a deportee a more pleasant exile. On the other hand, no one known to have been banished to Corsica or Sardinia may be called a typical deportee: Anicetus, Nero's loyal henchman and the false accuser of Octavia, was said to have been rewarded for his treachery with a very comfortable exile and long life on Sardinia, and Seneca was alleged to have committed adultery with Julia Livilla, making his crime an offence against the imperial house (see Appendix Two, nos. 25 and 28 for references). Of the other two men sent to these islands, one was executed immediately (hence, his deportation was not genuine), and the other was very elderly and the unhealthy climate was probably expected to finish him off rapidly (see Appendix Two, nos. 36 and 38 for references). Seneca recorded that other exiles were present on Corsica with him, but we do not know who these individuals were and whether they had been deported to Corsica or merely relegated from Italy.

⁵⁵ Juv. 1.73–4 (Gyaros), 6.562–4 (Cycladic islands and Seriphos), 10.168–73 (Gyaros and Seriphos), 13.245–6 (small Aegean islands).

⁵⁶ Those individuals merely relegated from Rome and Italy still had access to the mainland provinces, but if they were important enough the emperor might well confine them to a spe-



MAP TWO: Islands in the Aegean Sea used to hold exiled aristocrats.

islands at least fifty miles from the mainland he kept deportees off those coastal islands that were generally attached to provinces.⁵⁷ His inclusion of Cos, Lesbos, Rhodes and Samos in his decree seems to have been disingenuous, since we do not know of any exiles who were actually permitted to reside on them, which is remarkable considering that they had been favourite residences for Roman exiles in the Republic. Augustus, therefore, wanted deportees not only on islands, but islands that did not constitute or belong to a province. Perhaps the best example of this policy is Cassius Severus, who in A.D. 24 was sentenced to a lesser form of banishment – *relegatio* – that exiled him from Rome and Italy but did not deport him to a specific island. Cassius settled in Crete, a Roman province, where he continued to publish treatises offensive to the emperor. Because of this unrepentant behaviour, he was subjected to the more severe form of exile – *deportatio* – and sent to Seriphos, a small island in the Aegean where Severus would live in harsh conditions and find no audience for his provocative writings.⁵⁸ Thus it had been

cific place (albeit not an island). For example, when the Greek orator Moschus was relegated to Massilia we hear of no further restrictions, but when two Roman citizens of the senatorial class were relegated to the same city, they were specifically ordered to remain within the town walls (Appendix Two, nos. 19 and 27).

⁵⁷ The province of Asia included most of the islands along its coast (Magie [n. 41], 155). Athens, Massilia and Sparta each owned nearby islands, and although these cities were autonomous they – and the islands they owned – were nevertheless part of a province (Athens: Strab. 5.1.7, 9.1.10–11; Massilia: Strab. 4.1.10; Sparta: Dio Cass. 54.7.1–2). See Appendix One.

⁵⁸ See Appendix Two, nos. 6 and 15.

acceptable for Severus to live in a Roman province when he was merely relegated, but when given the heavier form of exile he was transferred to an island outside the provinces.

Thus a major effect of Augustus' reform was to sweep deportees out of the provinces. By choosing to send troublesome members of the aristocracy to the cluster of autonomous islands in the Aegean, Augustus was exiling them to the only inhabitable area within Rome's empire that was external to *both* Italy and the provinces.⁵⁹ While there were exceptions, the general rule of the emperors seems to have been to send deportees into this geographic phantom zone and to leave them there. It is clear that banishment *away* from Rome was a devastating punishment for a Roman aristocrat to whom that city was the centre of the world, but it is less clear why Augustus and his successors should be at such pains to keep exiled aristocrats *out* of the provinces. Why was Seriphos better than Tomis? Why send a potential aristocratic enemy into banishment on an unguarded island in the middle of the empire when there were cohorts under loyal legates and fortified cities under picked governors and outposts on the edges of the empire that could guard the exile far more effectively? Why was it so important to keep banished aristocrats not only away from Rome but out of the provinces?

II. IMPERIAL CONTROL OF SENATORIAL TRAVEL

It turns out that exiles were not the only ones Augustus ordered out of the provinces. Throughout his principate the emperor maintained a careful policy of regulating all senatorial travel outside of Italy, which ensured that no senator entered a Roman province without Augustus' knowledge and approval. The importance – and indeed the very existence – of this policy has been overlooked generally, but it is nevertheless the case that, from the beginning of the Augustan regime, all senators were forbidden to leave Italy and travel in the provinces without the permission of the emperor. Only a small number of modern historians have noted – in whole or in part – the existence of this policy,⁶⁰ and to my knowledge only R.J.A. Talbert has discussed it at any length.⁶¹ Talbert notes the usefulness of this policy for ensuring regular attendance at meetings of the senate, and although he cautions that evidence for enforcement of the travel ban is slim, he does indicate that the emperors had

⁵⁹ E. Gabba, 'True history and false history in Classical Antiquity', *JRS* 71 (1981), 55–60 argues that islands had a mystique about them – an 'otherworldliness' – that separated them from the mainland in the imagination and thought of ancient Greco-Roman culture.

⁶⁰ Balsdon (n. 3), 113, R. Syme, *The Augustan Aristocracy* (Oxford, 1986), 9 and M. Reinhold, *From Republic to Principate* (Atlanta, 1988), 212–13 all noted this regulation, but they did not explore the motives for the policy (Syme doubted that it was ever truly enforced). M. Goodman, *The Roman World* (London and New York, 1997), 196 and 204 mentions that Narbonensis and Sicily were eventually made accessible to senators, and A. Lintott, *Imperium Romanum* (London, 1993), 173 likewise refers to Narbonensis, but neither comment upon the reason why these areas were opened to senators nor upon the original prohibition. R.J.A. Wilson, *Sicily under the Roman Empire* (Warminster, 1990), 45 suggests that Sicily may have been opened to senatorial travel to speed Romanization, but does not discuss the original prohibition. Finally, C. Moatti, *Le contrôle de la mobilité des personnes dans l'empire romain*, *MEFRA* 112.2 (2000), 938–40 has pointed to the inability of senators to travel freely, but like Talbert (see below) she focusses primarily upon the presumed goal of retaining senators in Italy.

⁶¹ R.J.A. Talbert, *The Senate of Imperial Rome* (Princeton, 1984), 138–41.

good reasons to keep senators out of some provinces.⁶² This cautious endorsement of the argument that emperors did indeed enforce restrictions against unauthorized elite travel is strengthened by the practice of deportation to islands, which provides valuable evidence indicating that Augustus did exercise considerable control over the movements of the senatorial order, and was in particular determined to deny senators (including those in exile) free access to the provinces. This policy was maintained by his successors, although some of them (out of confidence or carelessness) made exceptions they came to regret. While this aspect of imperial control was far more subtle than *imperium maius* or tribunician *potestas*, it was nevertheless a very important component of Augustan rule because it provided the emperors with a means of containing the potent social force of aristocratic prestige and influence without resorting to open oppression.

Augustus' policy for regulating elite travel appears to have been one of the very first innovations he made in his efforts to consolidate his domination over the empire. Dio states that this restriction was established in 29 B.C., when senators were prohibited from leaving Italy without permission, although eventually Sicily and Narbonese Gaul were exempted from this rule.⁶³ While senators of the Late Republic had usually registered their plans to travel abroad with the senate and received what Reinhold calls '... the fiction of *legatio libera* ("unrestricted ambassadorship") by action of the senate', Augustus' decree and his resultant capacity to deny senators permission to leave Italy was quite new and unprecedented.⁶⁴ It is common knowledge that Augustus decreed that Egypt was off-limits to senators and illustrious equestrians, and it should not be surprising that he also used this type of regulation to protect his control over the other provinces as well.⁶⁵ Indeed, the remarkable proximity in time of the two decrees – Egypt was made a province and forbidden to senators in 30 B.C., and senators were forbidden to leave Italy (and thereby enter other provinces) in 29 B.C. – should lead us to understand the two as part of the same strategy.⁶⁶ This policy of regulating senatorial travel seems

⁶² Talbert (n. 61), 140: 'Since all emperors were no doubt pleased to be kept informed of the movements and plans of senators, and since there were sound political reasons for keeping them out of certain provinces, we might reasonably guess that some observance of the regulations did persist.'

⁶³ Dio Cass. 52.42.6–7. Kelly (n. 3), 129 notes the curious fact that during Julius Caesar's dictatorship A. Caecina had received permission from Caesar to live in Sicily until the year 45 B.C. Kelly points out that exiles at that time were only barred from Italy, and suggests that Sicily's strategic importance may explain the necessity of Caesar's permission for an exile to reside there. While Kelly is certainly correct about the importance of Sicily (especially in a time of civil war), this episode may also indicate that the Romans were already beginning to think of Sicily conceptually as a part of Italy. If so, then perhaps Sicily was open to senators from the very inception of Augustus' regulation of senatorial travel.

⁶⁴ Reinhold (n. 60), 212–13. Reinhold does point out (213) that consuls in the Republic had the ability to recall absent senators in times of crisis, but this is very different from forbidding senators to leave Italy in the first place. For discussion of the *legatio libera*, see Moatti (n. 60), 938–40.

⁶⁵ Tac. Ann. 2.59.3: *nam Augustus, inter alia dominationis arcana, vetitis nisi permissu ingredi senatoribus aut equitibus Romanis inlustribus, seposuit Aegyptum* ('for Augustus, among the other secrets of domination, isolated Egypt by forbidding senators or illustrious equestrians to enter it without permission' [cf. Tac. Hist. 1.11.1]).

⁶⁶ The emphasis on imperial control of Egypt derives largely from Tacitus' account of Germanicus' trip to Egypt, which angered Tiberius because Germanicus had failed to receive permission to enter this province (Tac. Ann. 2.59.2: *Tiberius ... acerrime increpuit quod contra instituta Augusti non sponte principis Alexandriam introisset*). On the debate about Germanicus'

to have been strictly maintained, since senators were only able to escape a serious famine in Italy in A.D. 6 because Augustus published a special, and temporary, dispensation allowing them to leave Italy.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Augustus also decreed that all retiring governors had to return to Rome from their provinces within three months of laying down their commands, thereby reducing significantly the licence of powerful men to remain in the provinces.⁶⁸ Augustus' regulations also extended to his own family: in 6 B.C. his stepson Tiberius had to go on a hunger strike in order to receive permission to depart from Italy in order to travel to Rhodes, and he was long denied permission to return to Italy.⁶⁹ The new imperial post system probably helped to enforce Augustus' regulations, since the changing stations that were distributed along the empire's highways could easily monitor traffic, especially that of senators and other high-profile aristocrats with large entourages. Indeed, since those senators travelling on official business bore *diplomata* that authorized their use of the post, any senator who lacked a *diploma* would probably have attracted the particular notice of imperial officials.⁷⁰ Claudius even punished some equestrians for leaving Italy – presumably on private business – without his permission and the proper travel documents (*se inscio ac sine comaeatu*).⁷¹ For this reason it is probably safe to assume that exiles (especially those unaccompanied by guards) carried some form of passport authorizing their presence outside of Italy, such as Seneca mentions when he writes that Augustus gave *diplomata* to the exiled adulterers of his daughter to ensure their trip into banishment.⁷²

Augustus' successors would be equally vigilant in regulating senatorial travel. Tiberius decreed that all sitting magistrates had to remain in the city of Rome during their term in office, thereby making official what had been an informal practice of Augustus, and Suetonius thought it noteworthy that Tiberius allowed even a single exception to this rule.⁷³ When Rubrius Fabatus was discovered travelling through the Sicilian Strait in A.D. 32/3, a centurion hauled him back to Rome for questioning, presumably because he had neither property in Sicily nor imperial permission to leave Italy.⁷⁴ That a centurion knew to arrest Fabatus and bring him before the emperor demonstrates that the restriction on senatorial travel was common knowledge. Fabatus was unable to provide an acceptable explanation for his unauthorized departure from Italy, so he was placed under guard and held on suspicion of harbouring illicit intentions.⁷⁵ Under Caligula a former praetor, claiming severe illness, applied to the emperor for an extension of his permission

Egyptian trip see B. Kelly, 'Tacitus, Germanicus and the kings of Egypt (Tac. *Ann.* 2.59–61)', *CQ* 60 (2010), 221–37 and D. Hennig, 'Zur Ägyptenreise des Germanicus', *Chiron* 2 (1972), 349–65.

⁶⁷ Dio Cass. 55.26.

⁶⁸ Dio Cass. 53.15.6.

⁶⁹ Suet. *Tib.* 10.2, 11.4–13.2.

⁷⁰ For discussion of the *diplomata* and the movement of government officials, see Moatti (n. 60), 941–3.

⁷¹ Suet. *Claud.* 16.2. The *comaeatus* was an imperial version of the Republican *legatio libera* for travelling aristocrats (Moatti [n. 60], 940).

⁷² Sen. *Clem.* 1.10.3–4.

⁷³ Suet. *Tib.* 31.1. Tiberius allowed the senate to contravene this rule by authorizing a praetor-elect to travel abroad, but Suetonius offered this as an example of Tiberius' early moderation.

⁷⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 6.14.2.

⁷⁵ Although he gives no definitive explanation for Fabatus' illegal departure from Italy, Tacitus suggests that he was arrested under suspicion of attempting to escape the tumultuous affairs in Italy by fleeing to Parthia.

to remain abroad in Greece; Caligula had him killed instead.⁷⁶ Claudius took great personal interest in this policy: he extended the regulation of travel to include certain equestrians, and he made it his own prerogative to approve senatorial travel requests.⁷⁷ Furthermore, it was Claudius who granted senators unrestricted access to Narbonese Gaul – a privilege that had already been extended to senators travelling to Sicily by that time.⁷⁸ It is likely that this decision was motivated by a high number of senatorial requests to leave Italy in order to travel to Massilia and Narbonese Gaul for business or pleasure, a congestion of applications that the emperor's dispensation was intended to alleviate. While it is difficult to determine how aggressively senatorial travel was controlled, Claudius' decision to extend the exemption of Sicily to Narbonese Gaul suggests that he intended to enforce the regulation of travel to the rest of the empire, and Dio – a Roman senator – recorded that this constraint was still being enforced in the third century A.D.⁷⁹ Some reasons for travel seem to have been generally accepted: senators were certainly permitted to visit estates they held outside of Italy (and Nero even requested that a particular senator reside permanently on his family's holdings in the province of Asia);⁸⁰ and senators could travel for the purpose of sightseeing, even visiting Egypt – that most carefully guarded of all provinces – if they first received permission.⁸¹ Indeed, senators and equestrians could own land and live in Egypt, so long as they were authorized by the emperor to do so.⁸² There can be no doubt that senators could and did travel throughout the empire, but it would seem that they did so only with the knowledge and approval of the emperor.

Regulation of travel in the provinces seems a minor matter compared to Augustus' control of armies and his supremacy in the senate, but such a restric-

⁷⁶ Suet. *Calig.* 29.2. He had originally been given a period of leave to live in Greece to improve his health.

⁷⁷ Regulation of equestrians: Suet. *Claud.* 16.2; Claudius takes personal control of approvals: Suet. *Claud.* 23.2; Dio Cass. 60.25.6–7. It had previously been the responsibility of the senate to review such requests and – after consulting the emperor – to grant or deny permission to travel in the provinces.

⁷⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 12.23.1.

⁷⁹ Dio Cass. 52.42.6–7.

⁸⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 14.22.3. The number of senators owning land in the provinces was not necessarily a large number when Augustus first imposed this travel regulation. I. Shatzman, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics* (Brussels, 1975), 30 and 460–1 points out that in the period from Sulla to Augustus, only 29 senators (other than Augustus and Agrippa) are known who owned land in provinces: four in Spain, three each in Asia, Greece and Sicily, two each in Africa, Epirus, Istria and Transalpine Gaul; one each in Egypt and the Thracian Chersonesus. Reinhold (n. 60), 140 also notes that some Romans owned land in Egypt.

⁸¹ This is, of course, what Germanicus had failed to do, thereby angering the emperor. See L. Casson, *Travel in the Ancient World* (Baltimore and London, 1994), 285. On the active tourism industry of Egypt, see V.A. Foertmeyer, 'Tourism in Graeco-Roman Egypt' (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Princeton, 1989), 104–24, 159–81, 208–30.

⁸² Dio Cass. 51.17.1: ... ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐνεπιδημεῖν αὐτῇ ἑξουσίαν ἔδωκεν, ἂν μὴ τινι αὐτὸς ὀνομαστὶ συγχωρήσῃ ('... but he did not give [senators] permission to live there, unless he himself conceded the privilege to a man by name'). Reinhold (n. 60), 140–1 states that senators were not permitted to live in Egypt, but he seems to be speaking in general terms only and does not take into account that senators could receive individual concessions from the emperor. M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (Oxford, 1957), 671 provides a list of ten members of the senatorial or equestrian orders who owned land in Egypt under the Julio-Claudians (mostly under Augustus). Naturally, ownership of land in Egypt does not prove residence there, but several of the individuals identified by Rostovtzeff were friends and supporters of Augustus and could safely be granted access to that strategic province.

tion was clearly of the utmost importance to the emperor, since it was among his first reforms after Actium and preceded his acquisition of other powers by several years.⁸³ Furthermore, the fact that this regulation was still in place and enforced under later emperors demonstrates that it was not made redundant or superseded by the multitude of powers Augustus acquired in 23 B.C. Rather, the ability to regulate the movements of the aristocracy complemented the emperor's other powers by providing him with the necessary means to control the potent and pervasive influence that aristocratic prestige wielded in Roman society. Following his defeat of Mark Antony in 31 B.C., Augustus' legal and military positions were strong: as consul he held the highest judicial and legislative prerogatives in Rome, and his possession of multiple *provinciae* gave him legitimate command over most of Rome's legions. Despite these substantial powers, however, he had no way of controlling or suppressing the tremendous social power wielded by the elite of Roman society, who were often tacitly – and some openly – opposed to his domination.⁸⁴ Although the civil wars had greatly diminished the *nobiles*, there were still senators who possessed immense ancestral prestige, many of whom sprang from far more distinguished and respected families than the Octavii and could even hold their heads up beside the ancient – if recently undistinguished (excepting of course the controversial Caesar) – Julii. Any one of these senators could, under the proper circumstances, use his family's *auctoritas*, resources and connections to acquire political status and power independent of the new *princeps*. The young Augustus was surrounded by men of ancient family, and the assassination of Caesar by such names as M. Junius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus had demonstrated that the importance and ambition of men with ancient names were not readily undervalued by the wise. Nor were such concerns eliminated by the victory at Actium: after seven years of humiliating exile, Augustus' old enemy M. Aemilius Lepidus was still nominated – over Augustus' objection – for membership in a revised senate list by Antistius Labeo, who maintained that Lepidus' great prestige made him worthy of the honour.⁸⁵ Men of famous name were the natural rallying points for conspiracies against the emperor, and Augustus had to crush several aristocratic plots that were led by such names as Aemilius Lepidus (the younger), Licinius Murena, Fannius Caepio, Marcus Egnatius, Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Iullus Antonius.⁸⁶

⁸³ It is possible that Caesar was considering a similar ban on senatorial travel: as dictator he decreed that the sons of senators could not go abroad except as the companion or subordinate of a magistrate (Suet. *Iul.* 42.1: *neu qui senatoris filius nisi contubernalis aut comes magistratus peregre proficisceretur ...*).

⁸⁴ R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939 [2002]), 368, 'Before his marriage to Livia, only one descendant of a consular family (Cn. Domitius Calvinus) belonged to [Octavian's] faction ... the aristocracy were slow to forgive the man of the proscriptions' (see also Syme [n. 60, 1986], 28). K.A. Raaflaub and L.J. Samons, 'Opposition to Augustus', in K.A. Raaflaub and M. Toher (edd.), *Between Republic and Empire* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1990), 417, 'That there existed opposition under Augustus and that much of it was aimed no less at the new system and individual solutions introduced by Augustus than at the *princeps* himself cannot be doubted' and 454, '... contrary to all expectations, opposition to Augustus was scattered, isolated, ineffective, and, overall, minimal'.

⁸⁵ Suet. *Aug.* 54 (cf. Dio Cass. 52.42.1–3).

⁸⁶ Vell. Pat. 2.91.2; Suet. *Aug.* 19.1; Tac. *Ann.* 1.10.4 (cf. Dio Cass. 55.27); Sen. *Brev.* 4.5. On the identities and motives of these conspirators, see Raaflaub and Samons (n. 84), 417–54. On the problem of identifying Licinius Murena, see M. Swan, 'The consular Fasti of 23 B.C. and the conspiracy of Varro Murena', *HSPH* 71 (1967), 235–42 and Syme (n. 60), 387–8. Later

Aristocratic prestige – *dignitas* – had been a major component of Roman politics throughout the Republic, enabling men like the famous Scipios to acquire honours while still young, boosted to high office early by their family's name.⁸⁷ In more recent times Marius and Cicero had to struggle against the advantages of their more prestigious political opponents, carrying the humiliating stigma of being a *novus homo* up every step of the political ladder. Catiline – with the support of P. Cornelius Lentulus Sura and other aristocrats – had been so convinced that his prestigious lineage automatically entitled him to honours and a consulship that he was willing to start a civil war in order to defend this entitlement.⁸⁸ Despite the political successes of men like Marius, Pompey and Cicero, most important military commands and political power in the Late Republic remained in the hands of men with prestigious family names.⁸⁹ Cicero, having elbowed his way through the nobility to win a consulship, observed that a man could win elections in Rome simply by the family name he bore, largely because Romans expected sons to emulate their fathers.⁹⁰ In Rome's hierarchical society people lower on the social ladder were irresistibly drawn to the *dignitas* of the senatorial order, and J.E. Lendon has demonstrated that *dignitas* and honour continued to be fundamental social forces in the Roman Empire that could be used to considerable social and political effect, and that emperors were very nervous of those who possessed the most.⁹¹ Of course, the new *princeps* had more than enough power at his fingertips to quash any one possible rival, but such open tyranny worked against the traditional appearance that Augustus thought it wise to project. Instead of crushing senatorial influence, therefore, he sought to circumscribe it by controlling senators' ability to use their *auctoritas* on susceptible audiences. Later emperors would be less reserved in their open use of force, but in the early years of his rule Augustus attempted to find alternatives to naked oppression to control the aristocracy.

emperors would continue to feel threatened by men of famous name (Tac. *Ann.* 6.9.3, 12.52.2, 13.47.1, 14.22.1, 14.57.2–3, 15.56.4).

⁸⁷ Scipio Africanus was elected proconsul in 210 B.C. even though he was only twenty-six years old (Livy 26.18.1), Scipio Nasica (who was not yet old enough to stand for the quaestorship) was chosen the 'best of the Romans' in order to receive the Great Goddess to Rome in 204 B.C. (Livy 29.14.8) and Scipio Aemilianus was elected consul even though he was only standing for the aedileship (Livy *Per.* 49).

⁸⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 31.7: *Catilina, ut erat paratus ad dissimulanda omnia, demisso voltu, voce supplicis postulare a patribus coepit ne quid de se temere crederent; ea familia ortum, ita se ab adolescentia vitam instituisse ut omnia bona in spe haberet; ne existumarent sibi, patricio homini, cuius ipsius atque maiorum plurima beneficia in plebem Romanam essent, perdita re publica opus esse ...* and 35.3: (Catiline writes to Catulus) *iniuriis contumeliisque concitatus, quod fructu laboris industriaeque meae privatus statum dignitatis non obtinebam ...*

⁸⁹ Syme (n. 84), 10–27. For example, between the years 133 and 49 B.C., sixteen families held 115 out of 170 (68%) consulships (the Aemilii, Aurelii, Caecilii, Calpurnii, Cassii, Claudii, Cornelii, Domitii, Julii, Junii, Licinii, Marcii, Mucii, Papirii, Porcii and Valerii).

⁹⁰ Cic. *Pis.* 2 and *Rab. Post.* 2. On the disadvantages of new men and the advantages of the *nobiles*, see T.P. Wiseman, *New Men in the Roman Senate 139 B.C. – A.D. 14* (Oxford, 1971), 100–16.

⁹¹ J.E. Lendon, *Empire of Honour* (Oxford, 1997), 'Honour among aristocrats, once acquired, was not a passive possession, like an engraved watch or an honorary degree. Rather, those who had honour were able to exert power in society by virtue of the desire of others for it, and the concern of others not to lose it' (55); '... honour was a source of legitimate social authority, that is, of an authority people were brought up to obey' (69); and 'men of too much renown were dangerous to the emperor, and suspected by him, so contemporaries thought. Men with a smaller portion were no threat' (111).

Although Rome was the heart of the empire, the exercise of power required the control of provinces and the resources they contained. In the Late Republic, command of one or more provinces had been essential if a Roman senator were to be a serious contender in civil war: Sulla, Marius, Pompey and Caesar had all used the resources and armies of the provinces against their political enemies, and renegades like Sertorius and Sextus Pompeius had spread havoc in Rome for years based on their respective control of Spain and Sicily. Octavian himself had spent a decade competing with Antony and Lepidus to bring more provinces under his sway because they were – and would continue to be – rich sources of soldiers, wealth, supplies and clients, all of which were necessary for initiating and conducting war. Anyone wishing to rival the emperor, therefore, would have to gain control over the resources of at least one province if he were to have any chance at succeeding. Rome was the empire's heart and brain, but the provinces were the muscle that enforced Rome's will, and, as Tacitus would later describe the situation, an emperor could be made outside of Rome.⁹² Provinces (with their legions and resources) were the greatest sources of power in the empire, and Augustus was determined to safeguard his control over them by every means possible.⁹³ While he could have simply murdered dangerous aristocrats whose power in the provinces grew too great, the emperor preferred to avoid such despotic action by preventing senators from acquiring such commands in the first place. In his 'First Settlement' with the senate (27 B.C.), therefore, Augustus retained for himself (initially) the provinces of Egypt, Gaul, Spain and Syria, which gave him direct command over 20 or 21 of Rome's legions, although by the end of his rule he commanded all but one.⁹⁴

Still, this careful monopoly of military command was not sufficient to guarantee the loyalty of the legions, as the revolt against Nero would demonstrate. Men of exceptional prestige and reputation could and would still attract the respect and loyalty of the emperor's legions – in A.D. 14 the German legions offered to make Germanicus emperor instead of his adoptive father Tiberius.⁹⁵ While no senator could surpass Augustus' status and *dignitas*, the emperor was not always present with his legions; direct command was delegated to legates who commanded in the emperor's name, and who occasionally had trouble keeping their soldiers under proper discipline.⁹⁶ The legions were tempting and critical targets for anyone wishing to topple the *princeps*, and the traditional way to win over Roman soldiers

⁹² Tac. *Hist.* 1.4.2: *evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri.*

⁹³ One could argue that Augustus' command over the legions rendered other methods of control redundant, but the emperor's thoroughness in protecting his position from all possible avenues of attack was famous; one need only reflect that, in addition to being *pontifex maximus*, Augustus made himself an *ex officio* member of all other priestly colleges – as if the *septemviri epulones* might topple his rule!

⁹⁴ Initially, as many as seven or eight legions were distributed among the 'public' provinces of Africa, Illyricum and Macedonia, but as Augustus and his subordinates expanded Rome's northern border to the Danube the legions of Illyricum and Macedonia were transferred to the imperial provinces of Moesia and Pannonia, leaving only a single legion (the III *Augusta* in Africa) stationed in a public province.

⁹⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 1.35.3.

⁹⁶ At the death of Augustus the imperial legates commanding legions along the Rhine and Danube lost control of their soldiers, and military discipline could only be restored by sending the emperor's own sons (Tac. *Ann.* 1.16.1–45.2). See B. Campbell, *The Emperor and the Roman Army 31 B.C. – A.D. 235* (Oxford, 1984 [1996]), 365–74.

was to stress the *auctoritas* and *dignitas* of one's lineage.⁹⁷ In the Late Republic armies had been drawn to the power of famous names: the blue-blooded Catiline and the sons of Pompey the Great had organized powerful and dangerous revolts,⁹⁸ and the famous Brutus and Cassius were able to take over entire provinces and armies not assigned to them.⁹⁹ Augustus had not only been able to raise an army using his adopted name of C. Julius Caesar,¹⁰⁰ but he also wrested the loyalty of Hirtius' and Pansa's legions from the state after the consuls' deaths, and years later he succeeded in drawing Lepidus' legions from him in Sicily.¹⁰¹ Even allied soldiers responded to the pull of ancestral prestige: in 46 B.C. Gaetulian soldiers serving under the Pompeians in Africa deserted to Caesar *en masse* when they were told that he was the relation of Gaius Marius, who had treated their people well a generation earlier.¹⁰²

Augustus knew from experience that famous names – and their associated reputations – had a magnetic attraction for Roman soldiers that could not be eliminated but could be substantially weakened by distance. An excellent example is the legion III *Augusta*. Augustus had been content to leave this legion under the command of the proconsular governor of Africa, but Caligula, perhaps sensing his own control over the legions to be weaker than that of his predecessors, removed this legion from the governor's control in A.D. 39 when he learned that the incoming proconsul of Africa was L. Calpurnius Piso.¹⁰³ This Piso was not only known to be exceedingly proud of his ancient and prestigious heritage, but his father had been the famous (and infamous) Calpurnius Piso who had been accused of tampering with the loyalty of the soldiers of Syria by supplanting the emperor as 'parent of the legions.'¹⁰⁴ An aristocrat's prestige was a potent weapon that could turn legions against an emperor: Nero merely scoffed at the report of the humble Vindex's rebellion, but – we are told – he fainted outright when he learned that the blue-blooded Servius Sulpicius Galba had also risen in revolt.¹⁰⁵ Two other rivals for the emperorship, Marcus Salvius Otho and Aulus Vitellius, were likewise from illustrious ancient families.¹⁰⁶ The responsiveness of the legions to illustrious names was well known and feared by the emperors: in A.D. 62 Nero was alarmed to learn that two famous senators, Rubellius Plautus (of the Julian clan) and Cornelius

⁹⁷ See Lendon (n. 91), 238–43.

⁹⁸ On Catiline, see Sall. *Cat.* 5.1, 16.4, 28.4, 35.3–4. On Pompey's sons, see [Caes.] *B. Hisp.* 1, and see Syme (n. 84), 157.

⁹⁹ Following Caesar's assassination, Cassius (who had been assigned the province of Cyrene) took over command of Asia and its vast resources (*MRR* 2.320), while Brutus ignored his province of Crete and instead took over Macedonia with its substantial army (*MRR* 2.321–2).

¹⁰⁰ Suet. *Aug.* 10.3. Note also Cicero's reference to the young Octavian as 'Caesar' in the *Philippics* (for example, see 3.3, 4.4, 5.45, 7.10, 8.5 and 10.15), and Augustus' identification of Caesar as *parentem meum* in the *Res Gestae* (2).

¹⁰¹ On his acquisition of the legions of Hirtius and Pansa, see Cic. *Fam.* 10.24.3, 11.14.2, 11.19.1–20.4; Vell. Pat. 2.62.5; App. *B. Civ.* 3.76 and 3.97. On Augustus winning over the legions of Lepidus, see Vell. Pat. 2.80.3–4; Suet. *Aug.* 16.4; App. *B. Civ.* 5.124–5; Dio Cass. 49.12.1–5, 50.1.3.

¹⁰² [Caes.] *B. Afr.* 32.

¹⁰³ Dio Cass. 59.20.7. The legion was transferred to the command of an imperial legate.

¹⁰⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 3.13.2. In the *SC de Cn. Pisone patre* Piso is said to have given out largesse to the soldiers in his own name from the imperial treasury and to have specially honoured those soldiers who called themselves 'Pisonians' (*CIL* II²/5 900, ll. 43–6).

¹⁰⁵ Suet. *Ner.* 40.4 and 42.1.

¹⁰⁶ Suet. *Otho* 1.1 and *Vit.* 1.1–3.

Sulla, were living in close proximity to large Roman armies.¹⁰⁷ Nero himself had thoughtlessly ordered Plautus to retire to his Asian estates and Sulla to retire to Massilia, but when he realized his mistake and the senators' nearness to the armies in Syria and Germany he immediately had both men killed.¹⁰⁸ Armies, perhaps more than any other part of Roman society, responded to the power of prestigious names, and therefore it was essential for Augustus and his successors to prevent powerful aristocrats from tampering with the loyalty of the legions.

Augustus had good reason to worry about the influence of aristocratic *auctoritas* upon his soldiers at the start of his rule. Whereas armies of the Republic had been temporary and changeable entities – they often formed, served and disbanded under a single commander, and few armies remained in one place long – Augustus sent his legions into permanent camps in Rome's frontier provinces following his victory at Actium in 31 B.C., establishing what would become the new imperial army.¹⁰⁹ For the first time, legions were permanently stationed in the provinces far from Rome and from their commander-in-chief, and those masses of soldiers would have been very tempting prizes for disgruntled senators still smarting from Augustus' new pre-eminence over the entire empire. It cannot have been a coincidence, therefore, that in 29 B.C. – only two years after the dispersal of the legions to permanent camps in the provinces – Augustus imposed his prohibition on unauthorized senatorial travel, thereby denying senators free access to the provinces and especially to the legions now quartered along Rome's frontiers. Likewise, the new positioning of the legions would have required Augustus to rethink Rome's policies regarding exile, since traditional *relegatio* from Italy would have permitted troublesome aristocrats to have contact with – and possibly suborn – the legions in the provinces. He eliminated this danger by adopting the policy of island exile for troublesome senators, placing them (and their influence) far from Rome's soldiers. Thus, it was likely the redeployment of Rome's legions to permanent camps in the provinces after the Battle of Actium that first drove Augustus to devise methods for regulating and limiting senatorial access to the provinces.

Three unusual appointments in the reigns of Tiberius and Nero illustrate especially well the tendency of emperors to prevent important senators from entering the provinces. These two emperors were known for honouring influential senators with important and prestigious provincial commands only to deny them permission to set out for their provinces. Tiberius honoured Aelius Lamia (in A.D. 21/2) and L. Arruntius (in A.D. 22/3) respectively with the governorships of Syria (with four legions) and Spain (with three legions), but withheld from them permission to leave Italy and enter their provinces.¹¹⁰ In Tacitus' words, Tiberius gave provinces to men he would not allow to leave the city.¹¹¹ Tiberius may well have been unnerved by

¹⁰⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 14.57.1: *conperitoque Plautum et Sullam maxime timeri, Plautum in Asiam, Sullam in Galliam Narbonensem nuper amotos, nobilitatem eorum et propinquos huic Orientis, illi Germaniae exercitus commemorat* [sc. Tigellinus].

¹⁰⁸ Plautus retired in A.D. 60 (Tac. *Ann.* 14.22.1–3) and Sulla in A.D. 58 (Tac. *Ann.* 13.47.1–3). Both were executed in A.D. 62 and their heads were brought back to the emperor (Tac. *Ann.* 14.57.4 and 59.2–3).

¹⁰⁹ See L. Keppie, *The Making of the Roman Army* (Norman, 1984), 132–71.

¹¹⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 6.27.2–3 (cf. *Hist.* 2.65.1–2).

¹¹¹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.80.3 (... *mandaverit quibusdam provincias, quos egredi urbe non erat passurus*) and 6.27.3 (*extremo anni mors Aelii Lamiae funere censorio celebrata, qui administrandae Syriae imagine tandem exsolutus urbi praefuerat ... [Tiberius] oblitus Arruntium, ne in Hispaniam pergeret, decumum iam annum attineri*).

Cn. Calpurnius Piso's attempted military coup in A.D. 19 and felt himself trapped: he was afraid to allow Lamia and Arruntius to take up their large and important commands, but could not give the provinces to less important men without insulting the senatorial elite.¹¹² He therefore allowed both senators to hold these prestigious commands for a decade, but they had to govern their provinces from Rome through legates. Likewise, Nero appointed P. Anteius to be the governor of Syria in A.D. 55, but did not give Anteius permission to enter his province and take up his command.¹¹³ In this way the emperor could win the support of certain important senators by bestowing high office and honours upon them, but he mitigated (in a back-handed way) the potential danger they represented. Although prestigious senators probably resented their confinement in Rome during their governorship, their *dignitas* was nevertheless increased by 'possession' of these provinces and use of the curule symbols of their office at the centre of all eyes in Rome. This was an innovative use of Augustus' regulation of senatorial travel, but his policy provided Tiberius and Nero with a way of separating potential rivals from the resources of the provinces.

A second advantage of confining elite persons to Italy was that it prevented them from acquiring dangerous levels of non-military influence abroad. Provincial cities, especially in the East, were a tremendous source of political and financial support, and had to be carefully guarded against ambitious senators. Indeed, since the *auctoritas* of the Roman elite was all the more potent in the provinces (where men of such prestige and importance were rare), rich provincial cities would have been tempting targets to senators seeking to augment their own status.¹¹⁴ Prestigious names were awe-inspiring and commanded obedience in the provinces: a young Julius Caesar, having been captured by pirates in 75/74 B.C. while travelling in the East as a private citizen, quickly and easily arranged for nearby cities to pay his ransom and, upon being freed, he raised a fleet of ships completely on his own authority and hunted down his former captors.¹¹⁵ Furthermore, when the governor of Asia delayed the punishment of these pirates, Caesar – without any official authority – removed them from prison and had them crucified. A short time later Caesar (still a *privatus*) raised a force of provincial troops to fight Mithridates' soldiers in 74 B.C.¹¹⁶ As a scion of one of Rome's most ancient families, Caesar certainly understood the power his descent granted him, and he knew well that provincial citizens would obey him even as a private citizen. Cities continued to respond favourably to Rome's aristocracy even after the rise of Augustus: in A.D. 34 many eastern cities flocked to support a man pretending to be the deceased Drusus,¹¹⁷ and in A.D. 66 Capito Cossutianus would tell Nero that, throughout the empire, provincials paid close attention to Thræsa Paetus and followed his displays

¹¹² On Piso's attempt to take over the governorship of Syria following the death of Germanicus, see Tac. *Ann.* 2.75.2–81.3.

¹¹³ Tac. *Ann.* 13.22.1.

¹¹⁴ R. MacMullen, 'How to revolt in the Roman Empire', *RSA* 15 (1985), 67–76 argues that an aristocrat contemplating rebellion against the emperor would frequently reach out to his friends in various cities in search of support and encouragement. See also A.J.N. Wilson, *Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome* (Manchester, 1966), 171, 'obviously a noble exile, with adequate financial resources, could lord it in a provincial community'.

¹¹⁵ Vell. Pat. 2.41.3–42.3; Suet. *Iul.* 4.1–2; Plut. *Caes.* 1.8–2.7.

¹¹⁶ Suet. *Iul.* 4.1–2.

¹¹⁷ Dio Cass. 58.25.1.

of independence as published in Rome's daily journal (*diurna populi Romani*).¹¹⁸ When Nero ordered the execution of Rubellius Plautus, who was living in retirement in Asia, the emperor used the fabricated – but apparently plausible – charge that the province of Asia was flocking to support Plautus, and Tacitus writes that in consequence Plautus was urged by his father-in-law to use his famous lineage to gather allies and make real the false accusation of the emperor.¹¹⁹

Such was the magnetic power of Rome's aristocracy that even senators' wives could wield substantial and unwelcome power over provincials. In A.D. 21 a debate was held in the senate on whether senatorial wives should be banned from the provinces because of their capacity and tendency to abuse the privileges of their rank, and in A.D. 24 a former governor's wife was indicted along with her husband for extortion in the provinces.¹²⁰ In a speech that Dio attributes to Maecenas, Augustus is advised not merely to make use of Rome's elite citizens, but also to bring the most prestigious and important provincials to Rome in order to drain the provinces of eminent men who might use their prestige against the interests of the emperor.¹²¹ Claudius acted on this principle when he decided to summon an important provincial from Africa and make him a Roman senator, which – as Claudius is reported to have said – bound him in Rome with 'golden fetters'.¹²² This phrase articulates the effectiveness of this policy of imperial control: bestowing senatorial rank upon the most important provincials bound them to the emperor, but it simultaneously brought their mobility under imperial control by removing them from their home province (where their prestige was most effective) to the capital where they would be under the emperor's watchful eye. Claudius further attempted to control the influence of powerful provincials by declaring that those who had been banished from a province would also be forbidden to enter Rome or Italy.¹²³ This policy was a double blow to troublesome provincial members of the elite, since they were removed from the two regions where their influence was most effective: their home province and the capital of the empire. In a similar fashion, the great influence of deposed client kings could be diminished by removing them far from their former domains, as Rome did with the Jewish leaders Archelaus and Herod Antipas of Judaea, who were exiled to Vienne and Lugdunum respectively.¹²⁴ A Roman senator – one of the rulers of the world – had always made a tremendous impression on all but the greatest cities,¹²⁵ and Augustus reduced this potential for disruption by regulating the travel of Rome's elite citizens.

¹¹⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 16.22.3–4.

¹¹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 14.58.3–4.

¹²⁰ A.D. 21: Tac. *Ann.* 3.33.1–35.3; A.D. 24: Tac. *Ann.* 4.19.4.

¹²¹ Dio Cass. 52.19.2–3. Tacitus likewise records imperial efforts to remove influential but troublesome men from their home provinces: a disruptive Macedonian was relegated to an island distant from both Macedonia and Thrace (Tac. *Ann.* 3.38.2) and Thrasea Paeus proposed banishing a haughty Cretan from the island of Crete (Tac. *Ann.* 15.20.1–22.1).

¹²² Dio Cass. 60.29.2.

¹²³ Suet. *Claud.* 23.2.

¹²⁴ See Appendix Two nos. 4 and 23. Likewise, Tacitus (*Ann.* 2.58.1–2) records that in A.D. 18 Germanicus received a letter from the Parthian king Artabanus requesting that Vonones – a deposed Parthian king living in Syria – be removed farther away from Parthia. Apparently, Vonones had been able to use his influence and proximity to stir up insurrection among the Parthian aristocracy, so Germanicus had Vonones moved to Pompeiopolis in Cilicia, from which communication with Parthia would be much more difficult.

¹²⁵ See M. Gelzer, *The Roman Nobility*, tr. R. Seager (Oxford, 1969), 86–101 for a discussion of Roman patronage over communities in the Republic.

A third benefit of controlling senatorial travel was to isolate governors – particularly the imperial legates – from the rest of the aristocratic elite to prevent disaffected (or treacherous) senators from undermining the loyalty of those military commanders. Augustus tended to use senators of lower rank and prestige as his legates for two reasons: few of the *nobiles* actively supported his regime at first (see above), and the lower aristocracy made more reliable lieutenants because they were less likely to consider themselves viable aspirants to imperial power. Egypt is an obvious example: it was so important strategically that the emperor only trusted equestrians to govern it because their rank and status were too low to challenge the emperor credibly. Indeed, when an equestrian prefect (Tiberius Alexander) finally did rebel in A.D. 69, he did not consider claiming the principate for himself, but rather declared for his favourite contender, Vespasian.¹²⁶ Senators of lower status (or equestrians) could be safely entrusted with command of legions because they were less likely to attempt a coup, but their lesser prestige also rendered them more vulnerable to being overawed and outclassed by members of Rome's nobility. If a prominent senator was able to influence and win over an imperial legate, their combination of assets – great *dignitas* and command of soldiers – could pose a danger to the emperor. When Tiberius was living in self-exile on Rhodes and receiving visits from all eastern governors, he was widely rumoured to be using his presence there to lay the groundwork for rebellion against the emperor, and Bowersock has argued that the growing support among the Greeks for this famous man made his recall to Rome necessary.¹²⁷ Similarly, Augustus forbade Cornelius Gallus to reside in any of the imperial provinces because Gallus' tremendous reputation and prestige could easily outclass those of most imperial legates.¹²⁸ It was necessary specifically to ban Gallus from the imperial provinces because, as an equestrian, he was not restricted to Italy as were senators, and he could therefore travel freely and enter the provinces of less distinguished men (not until Claudius would illustrious equestrians be likewise confined to Italy).¹²⁹ The danger of disaffected aristocrats joining forces in the provinces became real when the unknown Vindex called upon the noble Galba to be the figurehead of the revolt against Nero, and Galba – to enhance his own prestige further – summoned to Spain the son of a noble senator who had been living with his exiled father on the nearby Balearic Islands.¹³⁰ The influence of aristocrats was potent, so Augustus prevented any tampering with his lieutenants by keeping senators far away from the commanders of his armies.

¹²⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 2.79.1; Suet. *Vesp.* 6.3.

¹²⁷ Suet. *Tib.* 12.2–3; G. Bowersock, 'Augustus and the East: the problem of succession', in F. Millar and E. Segal (edd.), *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects* (Oxford, 1984), 180–1.

¹²⁸ Suet. *Aug.* 66.2; Dio Cass. 53.23.5–6. Gallus had been the prefect of Egypt, which conferred substantial prestige on an individual because of the wealth of the province and the command of three legions stationed there (very few individuals ever had the opportunity to command three legions under Augustus' reign). Furthermore, Gallus had been extremely aggressive with those legions, covering himself with so much military glory that even a senior senator might envy him, and he publicized that glory by setting up images and inscriptions to himself throughout Egypt.

¹²⁹ Contrast Cn. Calpurnius Piso, whom Tiberius intended to ban from the imperial house for being a bad subordinate and for rejoicing at the death of Germanicus (see below). Tiberius did not have to ban Piso from the imperial provinces as well because – as a senator – Piso could not leave Italy without the emperor's permission.

¹³⁰ Suet. *Galb.* 10.1.

A fourth benefit of this form of regulation was to prevent senators (whether free or in exile) from interfering with the governors' administration of their provinces. Legates and proconsuls alike used their prestige and the deference it generated to control their provinces, so no governor could afford to have his authority undercut by the arrival of another prestigious aristocrat.¹³¹ The regulation of elite travel also protected governors from having to share the deference, obedience and awe that provincials paid to Roman senators. This ensured that each governor would be able not only to rule, but – even better – to enjoy the honour and privilege of unchallenged and undiminished rule in his province. Aristocrats held high expectations for the honours and privileges they would receive during their terms, expectations few emperors would dare to disappoint. Philo accurately caught this important aspect of the aristocratic elite's mentality when he recorded the anger and jealousy of Flaccus, the prefect of Egypt under Caligula, when King Herod Agrippa unexpectedly arrived in Alexandria. Flaccus' friends voiced the prefect's thoughts:

σὴ κατάλυσίς ἐστι ... ἡ ἐπιδημία τούτου· μείζονα τιμῆς καὶ εὐδοξίας ὄγκον ἢ σὺ περιβέβληται· πάντας εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστρέφει τὴν δορυφόρον τῶν σωματοφυλάκων στρατιὰν ὁρῶντας ἐπαγγύροις καὶ ἐπιχρύσοις ὅπλοις διακεκοσμημένῃν. ἔδει γὰρ ἦκειν εἰς ἐπικράτειαν ἐτέρου δυνάμενον πλὴν χρησάμενον εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἀσφαλῶς παραπεμφθῆναι; καὶ γὰρ εἰ Γαίος ἐπέτρεπε, μᾶλλον δ' ἡνάγκαζεν, ἐχρῆν ἐκλιπαρήσαντα παραιτήσασθαι τὴν ἐνθάδε ἄφιξιν, ἵνα μὴ παρενημερηθεῖς ὁ τῆς χώρας ἡγεμὼν ἀδοξῇ.

His sojourn here is your dismissal; he is arrayed in a greater magnitude of honour and prestige than you; he draws to himself all those seeing the ranks of spearmen of his bodyguard adorned with weapons decorated with silver and gold. Was it right for him to come to the dominion of another man when he was able to be carried safely to his own home by a fair voyage? Indeed if Gaius had left it open to him – or even forced him – to come, he should have persisted in entreating that his arrival here be excused, so that the governor of the province would not be dishonoured by being surpassed.¹³²

Herod did not threaten to usurp Flaccus' judicial, administrative or military seniority in Egypt, but the king's simple ability to draw the respect, deference and awe of the Egyptians made him a serious threat in the eyes of Flaccus and his Roman friends, since they found that their own status suffered in the presence of so prestigious a visitor. Augustus tried to avoid such situations by preventing senators from travelling freely into the provinces. Furthermore, when it was necessary for the emperors to send special agents into a province, they tended to use low-ranking senators or equestrians to avoid upstaging the provincial governors. When a tremendous earthquake devastated Asia, Tiberius sent a senator of only praetorian rank – who would pose no threat to the pre-eminence of the consular governor – to inspect the damage. Tacitus remarks that this avoided the natural rivalry and obstruction that would have broken out had another senator of consular rank been sent.¹³³ Likewise, when the senate decided to send a legate to Asia to oversee the construction of a temple to Tiberius and Livia, a senator of praetorian rank was chosen who was important enough to complete the task but would not infringe

¹³¹ J.E. Lendon (n. 91), 191–222 has demonstrated that the honour and *dignitas* of a provincial governor was essential to his ability to command and administrate.

¹³² Philo *In Flacc.* 30–1.

¹³³ Tac. *Ann.* 2.47.4: *delectus est M. Ateius e praetoriis, ne consulari obtinente Asiam aemulatio inter pares et ex eo impedimentum oreretur.*

upon the pre-eminence of the consular governor.¹³⁴ Aristocrats felt entitled to harvest honours from their provincial commands, and any interference with this tradition was dangerous. Nothing demonstrates this as well as the reaction of Cn. Calpurnius Piso when Germanicus was given *imperium maius* over the eastern provinces, including Piso's province of Syria.¹³⁵ Piso was deeply insulted by this transgression upon what he perceived to be his rights and privileges, and became openly insubordinate to the young prince, going so far as to countermand Germanicus' instructions to the cities and legions of Syria.¹³⁶ Although few aristocrats were as bold and arrogant as Piso, Augustus understood that his senatorial colleagues held expectations of their provincial commands that it was unwise to disappoint, and his regulation of elite travel was invaluable for preventing smaller-scale (but more frequent) disputes among aristocrats in the provinces.

III. CONCLUSION

In 29 B.C. Augustus was a young man trying to consolidate his hold over the Roman world. He was consul, possessed vast wealth and clientage, and commanded all of Rome's legions. He had not yet determined how to share power with the aristocracy, but he certainly recognized that they were his natural enemies and the greatest threat to his continued rule. The young *princeps* had power in abundance, but he wanted a more subtle way to limit the social power of the aristocracy without appearing to be a tyrant. In particular, he needed to solve the problem of influence: how could he have an aristocracy influential enough to help him govern the empire, but innocuous enough to pose no threat to him? His first major policy decision, therefore, was to decree that senators could not leave Italy without his permission, which meant that they could not enter any province without his knowledge and consent. In doing this, Augustus was adapting the regulations he had placed on Egypt the year before and making very clever use of provincial geography as it currently existed: instead of attempting to control or reduce aristocratic influence, the emperor contained it within geographic borders. While this innovation may have rankled some senators, it probably seemed minor compared to the sixty legions the *imperator* commanded at the time, and most senators probably found it easy to receive permission to travel whenever they wished. The obvious loophole in this strategy was the fact that Roman tradition allowed exiled aristocrats to wander freely throughout Rome's provinces, which would give Augustus' rivals access to the most sensitive parts of the empire, including Rome's legions that were now permanently stationed in the provinces. To counter this he began relegating particularly troublesome (or annoying) individuals to specific places in the empire – such as Ovid's banishment to Tomis – where these individuals could achieve little with their influence. This solution was better, but it still allowed exiles access to the provinces. By 2 B.C., therefore, Augustus had begun using remote islands to hold the most worrisome

¹³⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 4.56.3.

¹³⁵ For the conflict between Piso and Germanicus, see Tac. *Ann.* 2.43.1–6, 53.1–58.2, 69.1–72.2.

¹³⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 2.55.1 (Piso insults Germanicus in a speech to the Athenians), 2.57.1 (Piso refuses to send Germanicus legions when ordered to do so), 2.57.2–3 (Piso argues violently with Germanicus), 2.69.1 (Piso annuls or countermands Germanicus' instructions to Syrian cities and armies).

aristocrats, those under interdiction. This was a superior method of containment because many remote islands – particularly those in the Aegean – were neither part of Italy nor part of a province, but constituted rather a ‘neutral’ or ‘liminal’ zone within Roman geography. These islands were not ideal for secure incarceration, but security was not the emperor’s main concern – he could easily annihilate anyone who openly defied him. Rather, Augustus used these islands because their unique status and geographical location separated Roman exiles from the people and resources that were susceptible to the draw of aristocratic influence. In this way the emperors neutralized those aspects of an aristocrat that could not be forcibly taken from him: his *dignitas* and *auctoritas*. Therefore, Augustus’ control of elite travel – which included *deportatio ad insulam* – was an important addition to his other powers and prerogatives because it enabled him to control a critical aspect of Roman society that could not otherwise be suppressed by his virtual monopoly of *imperium*, legions or priesthoods.

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APPENDIX ONE: THE AUTONOMOUS STATUS OF THE CYCLADES IN THE AUGUSTAN AGE

The relationship of the Cyclades to the Roman provinces in the Late Republic and Early Empire is an uncertain and contested issue. Although we know that the islands eventually became a province (*provincia Insularum*) – probably under Vespasian, but certainly by the time of Diocletian – we have little information on the status of these islands in the Augustan Age.¹³⁷ Some scholars have argued that the Cyclades were attached to the province of Macedonia and Achaea at this time, whereas others maintain that they belonged to the province of Asia.¹³⁸ Most recently Étienne has argued that they belonged to the province of Asia, using three types of evidence: Republican (and a few imperial) dedications on these islands by and to governors appearing to be from Asia or other eastern provinces, the use in the province of Asia of judges drawn from the Cyclades, and the (admittedly minor) appearance of Roman tax collectors in the islands.¹³⁹ Unfortunately, this type of evidence only demonstrates a Roman presence in the Cyclades, but does not prove that the islands were incorporated into the province of Asia or even under the authority of its governor, and thus Étienne’s argument has failed to satisfy

¹³⁷ Vespasian: Sex. Rufius Festus, *Brev.* 10. Diocletian: S. Williams, *Diocletian and the Roman Recovery* (New York, 1985), 221–3; T.D. Barnes, *The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), 215; Magie (n. 41), 1428, who argues that there is no direct evidence for such a province until after the reforms of Diocletian. See also A.-M. Wittke, E. Olshausen, R. Szydlak, *Historischer Atlas der antiken Welt* (Der Neue Pauly [Suppl. 3]; Stuttgart, 2007), 183 and 186; R.J.A. Talbert (ed.), *The Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World* (Princeton, 2000), 101–2; and R.K. McElderry, ‘Some conjectures on the reign of Vespasian’, *JRS* 3 (1913), 116–21.

¹³⁸ For discussion see M. Sartre, *L’Orient romain* (Paris, 1991), 21–2; J.-L. Ferrary, ‘Délôs vers 58 av. J.-C.’, in J.-C. Dumont, J.-L. Ferrary, P. Moreau and C. Nicolet (edd.), *In insula sacra* (Rome, 1980), 43–4 and n. 38; and S. Accame, *Il dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto* (Rome, 1946), 234–41.

¹³⁹ R. Étienne, *Tenos II*, BEFAR 263 bis (Paris, 1990), 127–55.

critics.¹⁴⁰ The problem is the near-total silence of the historical sources; most of the evidence used in this debate is either Republican or dates to the second century A.D. or later, which leaves us to deduce the status of these islands under Augustus from mere scraps of information. Working under the assumption that the islands *must* have belonged to a Roman province, historians have searched valiantly to find evidence attaching the Cyclades to Greece or Asia, but I suggest that we take the silence of the sources at face value, and accept that the Cyclades were not formally attached to any province, but that they were left autonomous by Augustus and his immediate successors.

To begin with, many Aegean islands are known to have been free states under Augustus or to have belonged to free states, such as Amorgos, Astypalaea, Delos, Imbros, Lemnos, Scyros and perhaps Andros and Naxos.¹⁴¹ More important, there is a shocking absence of dedications to Augustan era governors in the Cyclades, which was *de rigueur* in all Roman provinces. Indeed, I am aware of only one such dedication found in these islands in the entire Julio-Claudian period, made by the city of Andros in A.D. 2 to P. Vinicius, the proconsul of Asia.¹⁴² This single exception draws attention to the remarkable absence of such dedications in the Cyclades, especially since the nearby island provinces of Cyprus and Crete made many dedications to their governors in this period, as did the islands of Chios, Cos, Lesbos, Rhodes and Samos, which were included in the province of Asia. The unusual silence in the Cyclades suggests that those islands did not have a Roman governor placed over them, and that Andros recognized Vinicius not as *their* governor, but merely as a Roman official who did a favour for the island, either while he was in transit to or from his province in Asia or after having been approached directly by the Andrians (see below).¹⁴³ Furthermore, Cycladic islands *did* make dedications to the emperors, making their silence towards governors even more striking.¹⁴⁴ Roman governors of Asia always travelled to their province by

¹⁴⁰ See e.g. N.K. Rauh, 'Review of: R. Étienne, *Tenos II*', *AJA* 96 (1992), 564–5, 'Despite Étienne's painstaking efforts, I find myself unmoved by his logic'.

¹⁴¹ Amorgos: R. Stillwell (ed.), *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites* (Princeton, 1976), 51 (autonomous); Andros and Naxos: Magie (n. 41), 1279 (removed from Rhodian control by Augustus after Actium; not known to have been given to any other state); Astypalaea: Pliny *HN* 4.71, Magie (n. 41), 473; Delos: Strabo 10.5.4 (owned by Athens); Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros: R.M. Kallet-Marx and R.S. Stroud, 'Two Athenian decrees concerning Lemnos of the late first century B.C.', *Chiron* 27 (1997), 189 (belonged to the free state of Athens; Imbros and Lemnos may have been removed at the end of Augustus' reign). See Wittke et al. (n. 137), 171, which shows Andros, Naxos and Tenos as 'client-states'.

¹⁴² *IG* XII, 5.756. Two further dedications to governors are found on Delos (*IDelos* 1624 and 1626), but both dedications were made by the Athenians – who owned the island – and those who lived on Delos. The specific reason why Athens set up dedications to governors of Asia is unclear (1626 provides only: ἀρετῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας), but it certainly does not indicate that Athens (or Delos) was under the jurisdiction of the proconsul of Asia. More likely Athens honoured these important Romans as they passed through the city *en route* to Asia, much as Germanicus did in A.D. 18 when, while travelling to the East, he was received at Athens with great ceremony (Tac. *Ann.* 2.53.3).

¹⁴³ The *lex de provinciis praetoriis* (Cnidos Copy, col. 4, ll. 31–9) indicates that governors of Asia and Macedonia could exercise their legal prerogatives outside their provinces while travelling to and from their provinces, and since governors of Asia normally travelled through the Greek islands to reach their provinces (e.g. Tac. *Ann.* 2.55.3 and Strabo 10.5.4), it is likely that Vinicius performed some legal favour for Andros immediately before or after his governorship of Asia.

¹⁴⁴ e.g. *SEG* 38, 819 (Naxos to Augustus), *SEG* 39, 848 (Astypalaea to Lucius Verus), *SEG* 45, 1029 (Delos to Augustus and his family).

sea, which would have given them ample opportunities to receive honours on the Cycladic islands if those islands had been part of their province.¹⁴⁵ Thus, if the Cyclades *were* included in a province, their inhabitants were unusual in the Roman Empire for not recognizing their governors beyond a single and brief inscription on Andros.

One might object that this argument is impossible because it leaves the islands outside of Roman control, but this was not at all the case: the Cyclades – even if excluded from a province – were firmly within the grasp of Roman government and authority. In the first place, islanders could and did approach the emperor directly with major issues, as did the island of Gyaros when it sought a reduction in its annual tribute in 29 B.C.¹⁴⁶ Second, the islanders could also have sought out the intervention of the proconsul of Asia or Achaëa with their most important legal problems even if they were not geographically part of his province.¹⁴⁷ Roman governors only stopped at a handful of assize centres during their *conventus* tour of the province, so they were accustomed to receiving petitions from a wide range of cities and individuals at every appointed stop.¹⁴⁸ And, as noted above, it was also possible for the Cycladic islanders to petition governors while *en route* to or from their eastern provinces, which may explain why the free city of Athens set up dedications to two governors of Asia on Delos, and why Andros set up a dedication to P. Vinicius. The islanders, therefore, fell under the aegis of Roman law even if they were not included in a province.

Furthermore, being autonomous and separate from the provinces did not release the Cyclades from taxation or remove them from Roman protection. Autonomous cities (unless specifically given immunity) still paid tax, and the case of Gyaros above demonstrates that islands knew full well what they owed to Rome.¹⁴⁹ Nor was a governor needed to oversee the tax collection; Millar and Jones have pointed out that, with the removal of the *publicani*, many communities supervised their own tax payments.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, being external to the provinces did not leave the islands unprotected from pirates or other dangers; Augustus stationed fleets throughout the provinces to suppress piracy, and Starr has demonstrated that the main fleet in the Aegean was stationed at Seleucia in Syria and protected a sphere

¹⁴⁵ On travelling to Asia by sea, see *Dig.* 1.16.4.5, in which Antoninus Pius made this customary mode of travel mandatory for proconsuls of Asia.

¹⁴⁶ Strabo 10.5.3.

¹⁴⁷ On the tendency of the Roman government to intervene in the administration of free states, see: Sartre (n. 138), 206; A. Lintott, 'What was the "*imperium Romanum*"?', *G&R* 28 (1981), 64; G.W. Bowersock, *Augustus and the Greek World* (Oxford, 1965), 88 with n. 4. F. Millar, 'Civitates liberae, coloniae and provincial governors', *Mediterraneo Antico* 2 (1999), 112, points out that free states in Asia that may have been outside the governor's jurisdiction nevertheless could appeal 'spontaneously' to the governor or emperor when it suited them.

¹⁴⁸ See G.P. Burton, 'Assizes and administration of justice under the Empire', *JRS* 65 (1975), 92–4 on assize centres. F. Millar 'State and subject: the impact of monarchy', in F. Millar and E. Segal (edd.), *Caesar Augustus: Seven Aspects* (Oxford, 1984), 41, points out that governors would only appear at the main assize centres and did not visit smaller cities or towns.

¹⁴⁹ Bowersock (n. 147), 85–9 outlines the ways in which autonomous states were still under the control of the imperial government, and Magie (n. 41), 474 and 1337 points out that autonomous states were still liable to taxation. Millar (n. 147), 109 even points out that some free cities in Asia were regular settings for the governor's jurisdiction.

¹⁵⁰ Millar (n. 148), 41 and A.H.M. Jones, 'Rome and the provincial cities', *Tijdschrift voor rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d'histoire du droit/The Legal History Review* 39 (1971), 540–1 point out that after Augustus' reforms many communities had to manage the collection and payment of their own taxes.

that stretched as far west as the Piraeus.¹⁵¹ This means that responsibility for the protection of the Aegean lay in the hands of a *praefectus classis* who answered to the governor of Syria, further weakening the assumption that the Cyclades fell under the supervision of the governor of Asia or Achaea. Indeed, Starr points out that – in the Augustan Age – the governors of public provinces (like Asia and Achaea) did not have ships at their disposal, and therefore were dependent upon the Syrian fleet for transport.¹⁵²

There is no reason to assume that these islands would or should have been part of a province. Rome had always ignored these small islands in its eastern expansion: after the defeat of Philip V and Antiochus the Romans had been content to hand most of the Aegean islands over to Pergamum and Rhodes, and even Crete was generally disregarded until it became a pirate stronghold.¹⁵³ In the Late Republic, the governor of Macedonia was given very broad authority to supervise the free states of Greece, but there is little evidence of any regular administration on the Cycladic Islands.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, the inconclusive scholarly debate over which Republican governor supervised the islands – Asia's or Macedonia/Achaea's – probably should be taken as evidence that *both* governors could exercise authority over the Cyclades because those islands were not clearly included in *either* province (in other words, neither governor was excluded from the islands). The Romans never seemed interested in taking direct control of any but the largest islands, probably because small islands were not worth the effort – they were too poor and weak to challenge Rome or be anything but compliant clients. Indeed, Mitchell has pointed out that no island states were included among the harbours listed in the customs zone of the province of Asia (as described in the *lex portorii Asiae*), a very strange omission suggesting either that the islands did not belong to the province of Asia until sometime after A.D. 62, when the text of the law was published, or that – for some unknown reason – island ports simply were not taxed as were the mainland ports of Asia.¹⁵⁵ Islands like Astypalaea – which correctly anticipated Rome's invincibility – approached Rome early and acquired very favourable treaties, but the rest were ignored or given away to Rome's friends: when Mark Antony controlled the East he gave to Athens the islands of Aegina, Icos, Ceos, Sciathos and Peparethos, and

¹⁵¹ C.G. Starr, *The Roman Imperial Navy* (Westport, 1941), 115–16. He cites the presence of sailors from the Syrian fleet at Ephesus, Teos, Tenos and the Piraeus, and argues that the fleet was a frequent presence in the Aegean. He notes that the Lycian League and Rhodes also had token fleets that were later absorbed. See also P. de Souza, *Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge, 1999), 182, 204 and 206 and L. Casson, *The Ancient Mariners* (Princeton, 1991), 187.

¹⁵² Starr (n. 151), 107 and 116. Starr supposes that 'vessels of the Syrian fleet may also have carried agents of the procurators and proconsuls of Achaea and Asia from island to island on tours of inspection', but his only evidence for this statement is a passage from Cicero that says Flaccus raised a fleet as proconsul of Asia for protection and ornamentation of Rome's rule (*Flac.* 27: *non solum praesidi sed etiam ornandi imperi causa navigandum fuisse*).

¹⁵³ On the settlement of the Aegean following the battles of Cynoscephalae (197 B.C.) and Magnesia (190 B.C.), see Magie (n. 41), 109–11. Crete was not formally made a province until 66 B.C. (*Cic. Flac.* 30; *Liv. Per.* 100; *App. Sic.* 6.2; Magie [n. 41], 1163).

¹⁵⁴ Cicero remarked on the broad sphere of the Macedonian governor's authority (*Dom.* 60, *Pis.* 37, 96).

¹⁵⁵ S. Mitchell, 'Geography, politics, and imperialism in the Asian customs law', in M. Cottier, M.H. Crawford, C.V. Crowther, J.-L. Ferrary, B.M. Levick, O. Salomies and M. Wörrle (edd.), *The Customs Law of Asia* (Oxford, 2008), 192–3. The surviving text of the *lex portorii Asiae* is a composite piece of legislation, containing clauses of several different laws ranging from 75 B.C. and A.D. 62 that addressed customs dues from Rome's province of Asia.

to Rhodes the islands of Andros, Naxos and Tenos.¹⁵⁶ Augustus (Octavian at the time) stripped Rhodes of these three islands after the Battle of Actium, and it is probable that he left them autonomous since they are not recorded as having been given to another state or province.¹⁵⁷ Indeed, it would have been highly unusual for Augustus to annex the islands to a province when Rome's normal method was to give such islands away to allies. Rome had always possessed a range of methods for dominating other states, and it was accustomed to offering degrees of freedom to those states who meekly accepted Rome's pre-eminence.¹⁵⁸ There is no reason, therefore, to assume that Octavian would have thought it necessary to force the Cyclades into one or another province when they could just as easily be left alone.

If anything, the Romans tended to imagine the Cyclades as forming their own territorial sphere. Pliny is perhaps the best example; in his account he isolates the Cyclades from the mainland, referring to them as being 'closed off' (*inclusae*) from the mainland by smaller seas, thereby forming a single geographic space with clear dimensions:

Cyclades et Sporades ab oriente litoribus Icaris Asiae, ab occidente Myrtois Atticae, a septentrione Aegaeo mari, a meridie Cretico et Carpathio inclusae per DCC in longitudinem et per CC in latitudinem iacent.

The Cyclades and Sporades are confined on the east by the Icarian shores of Asia, on the west by the Myrtoan shores of Attica, on the north by the Aegean Sea, and on the south by the Cretan and Carpathian seas, and establish an area 700 miles in length and 200 miles in width.¹⁵⁹

To Pliny – a well-educated Roman aristocrat and the commander of the Misenum fleet – these remote islands constituted their own space, which was physically separated from the mainland provinces. Strabo likewise treats the Cyclades as a separate geographic entity, whereas he includes his descriptions of coastal islands within his accounts of adjacent mainland provinces.¹⁶⁰ The identification of the Cyclades as a unique sphere was an old idea; in the fourth century B.C. they even formed their own political identity as the *koinon Insularum* (κοινὸν τῶν Νησιωτῶν) that probably lasted until the middle of the second century B.C.¹⁶¹ Billows argues that this *koinon* was 'a full-fledged federal state' that grew to include most of the Cyclades, but was distinct from the coastal islands of Asia, which belonged to the

¹⁵⁶ App. *B Civ.* 5.7.

¹⁵⁷ App. *B Civ.* 5.7 and see Magie (n. 41), 428, 441 and 1279 n. 3.

¹⁵⁸ See P.A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic* (Oxford, 1988), 293 and Lintott (n. 147), 64.

¹⁵⁹ Plin. *HN* 4.71. Pliny is describing the modern Cyclades, many of which he identifies as being among the (ancient) Sporades, including Amorgos, Anaphe, Cimolus, Donusa, Gyaros, Melos, Pholegandros, Schinoussa, Sikinos and Thera.

¹⁶⁰ Strab. 10.5.14. Thus, the Cyclades are treated as a single unit, whereas the Ionian islands are described along with Asia, and the African islands with Africa. This organization is repeated in his list of Roman provinces (17.3.25), which does not include islands in the open sea but only islands near the coast (κατὰ μὲν τὴν Εὐρώπην καὶ τὰς πρὸς αὐτῇ νήσους). Tacitus (*Hist.* 2.6.2) also speaks of the islands in the eastern Mediterranean as being geographically distinct from the provinces.

¹⁶¹ K.A. Sheedy, 'The origins of the second Nesiotic League and the defense of Kythnos', *Historia* 45 (1996), 423–49, and R.A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley, 1990), 220–5. On the end of the *koinon*, see Étienne (n. 139), 123–4.

Ionian League.¹⁶² Thus, from a very early date a fundamental separation of the Cyclades from the coastal islands was widely recognized in the East. Although this *koinon* dissolved in the second century B.C., it is likely that the identification of the Cyclades as their own political unit persisted in popular thought. Bowersock has emphasized Augustus' use of leagues to control the Greek states, stating that 'he encouraged the leagues. In a minor province they were more convenient units than individual cities, and they belonged to the evolution of Roman Greece'.¹⁶³ Bowersock even suggests that Augustus developed the Macedonian League as a means to improve its awkward system of government that dated back to 167 B.C.,¹⁶⁴ and given this attitude and preference, it seems likely that Augustus would have allowed the Cycladic Islands to operate as their own social and political unit.

Sometime after Actium, therefore, Augustus probably formalized what was already the *de facto* situation by dividing the Aegean islands into two groups. Coastal islands, on the one hand, were included within the nearest mainland province because they had long been politically and economically tied to the adjacent mainland. For example, the great islands of Chios, Lesbos, Samos and Rhodes had traditionally owned and cultivated land on the mainland, directly bonding them to the mainland as a single socio-economic sphere.¹⁶⁵ This connection was recognized by the incorporation of these (and other) coastal islands into the administrative sphere of the province of Asia, as is demonstrated by the many dedications found on the islands to proconsuls of Asia and the direct intervention of the proconsuls in the affairs of these cities (despite the fact that many enjoyed autonomy).¹⁶⁶ The close proximity of these islands to the mainland – the most important of them were less than ten miles offshore – made communication and transport easy and rendered efficient administration possible.¹⁶⁷ Indeed, the closeness of these islands is what bonded them to the mainland.

The Cyclades, on the other hand, were much farther away – some nearly one hundred miles from the nearest mainland. This distance, and the inherent dangers of sailing in ancient times, separated those islands from the mainland and rendered them an independent, self-contained geographic sphere. While it is certain that regular trade and travel existed between the Cyclades and the mainland,¹⁶⁸ such trips required two or more days of sailing with intermediary stops, making such passages significantly more complicated and inconvenient, especially in bad weather (which was frequent).¹⁶⁹ And even in the safest sailing seasons, the powerful Etesian

¹⁶² Billows (n. 161), 221–2.

¹⁶³ Bowersock (n. 147), 91.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 97.

¹⁶⁵ For traditional island holdings on the mainland, see Magie (n. 41), 71, 77–8, 84.

¹⁶⁶ See e.g. *IG* XII 2, 219 = *OGIS* 467 = *IGRR* 4, 94 (Lesbos dedication); *SEG* 41, 706 = *SIG*³ 785 = *RDGE* 70 = *EP*² 317 (Cos, letter from governor); *SEG* 30, 751 (Cos, letter from Corbulo); *IGRR* 4, 943 (Chios, letter from proconsul); *IGRR* 4, 963 = *OGIS* 469 (Samos dedication); *IGRR* 4, 972 and 995 (Samos dedication); *SEG* 43, 558 and 559 (Cos, honorary inscriptions to T. Statilius Taurus and his wife).

¹⁶⁷ For this and all distances below, see Talbert (n. 137).

¹⁶⁸ Strabo (10.5.4) remarks that Delos enjoyed a fortunate trading position because it was on the main sailing route from Italy and Greece to Asia. This route took merchants past almost all of the Cyclades, where prized trade goods like wine and Parian marble were produced. Roman officials also used the same sailing routes to reach the East, as did Cn. Calpurnius Piso when travelling to Syria from Rome (*Tac. Ann.* 2.55.3).

¹⁶⁹ L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Baltimore and London, 1995), 288, estimates that ancient ships sailing with the wind '... averaged between 4 and 6 knots over

winds could greatly complicate sailing in the Cyclades and render some of them nearly unreachable.¹⁷⁰ Furthermore, the availability (or unavailability) of good ports played a substantial role in determining an island's accessibility; for example, Tenos is only fifty-five miles from Cape Sunium, but it is eighty-five miles from the Piraeus. It is likely that Augustus and his contemporaries took the availability of ports into account when determining sailing distances and judging what qualified as a good island for exiles: Andros and Seriphos (both used for exiles) are only forty miles from the nearest mainland but over eighty miles from safe harbours at Athens. It was no doubt the distance and difficulty in reaching the Cyclades that made Augustus identify them as an ideal place for holding important exiles. When he decreed in A.D. 12 that all exiles were to live on islands at least fifty miles from the mainland, he must have been thinking of the Cyclades, since there are very few other islands in the Mediterranean that fit this description. Despite the convenience of travelling by sea, the distance of the Cyclades from the mainland – and the potential dangers of sailing – rendered those islands a separate and distinct zone from Asia or Greece. This rift had been demonstrated by the formation of the *koinon Insularum* as a distinct entity from the Ionian League, and the logic and convenience of treating the Cyclades as their own geographic unit may have appealed to Augustus.

Bowersock argued that 'Augustus' policy was to create a situation in which the Greek cities would be able to look after themselves as much as possible', and this goal was most easily achieved in the Cyclades.¹⁷¹ If we resist the convenient assumption that the Cyclades *must have* belonged to a province, the weight of the evidence suggests that Augustus left them external to the Roman provinces, making up their own territorial sphere. While it is true that Augustus was a great organizer, at his accession the islands were poor and unimportant – more fit for holding exiles away from society than for being brought into a major zone of Roman administration. It is probable that Vespasian – a military man less interested in Greek autonomy – added the Cyclades to the province of Asia (he deprived several other Greek states of their freedom), and two centuries later Diocletian created the *provincia Insularum* as a subsection of the diocese of Asia.¹⁷² Thus, although these islands eventually were attached to one (or more) of Rome's provinces, the evidence suggests that this happened long after the rule of Augustus. The Cyclades had never been particularly important to Rome, and it certainly made more sense for Augustus to leave them as a protectorate – a distinct geographic area that

open water, and slightly less while working through islands or along coasts'. Therefore, to reach Astypalaea, which lies approximately fifty-five miles from Cnidus, would take a ship making five knots in perfect sailing conditions nearly ten hours of continuous sailing time; if they could only make four knots the trip would take nearly twelve hours, and if they were slowed to three knots the voyage would take sixteen hours. In adverse weather and during the winter months rough seas could make the voyage far more difficult and dangerous.

¹⁷⁰ For a recent discussion of the complications posed by the Etesian winds, see C. Constantakopoulou, *The Dance of the Islands* (Oxford, 2007), 23–6, esp. 25: 'with the northern winds blowing, even the narrowest strait could prove to be an impossible obstacle for those attempting sea travel'.

¹⁷¹ Bowersock (n. 147), 99.

¹⁷² See n. 137 above. The statement by Rufius Festus (*Brev.* 10), that Vespasian created a *provincia insularum* is probably an anachronistic intrusion from Diocletian's reign, perhaps because Vespasian did deprive several Greek states (including the islands of Samos and Rhodes) of their freedom (Suet. *Vesp.* 8.4). For discussion see the old but still useful article by McElderry (n. 137), 116–21, who discusses Vespasian's reorganization of the province of Asia.

paid its taxes, sought Roman intervention when necessary, but otherwise was left autonomous and external to the provinces.

APPENDIX TWO: PLACES OF EXILE USED OR SUGGESTED
BY JULIO-CLAUDIAN EMPERORS

Table A1 (opposite) is a list of those locations known to have been used or suggested for holding exiles. Only those exiled by the emperor or the state are included below; individuals banished by their families (such as Sen. *Clem.* 1.15.2) are not included. The list includes both relegated and deported individuals (see notes on each entry).

Table A1

Place of Exile	Deportee (date of exile)	Reference(s)	Notes
1) Circei	M. Aemilius Lepidus (36 B.C.)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 1.53.4, 4.13.3 Suet. <i>Aug.</i> 16.4	
2) Massilia	Vulcacius Moschus (20 B.C.)	Sen. <i>Controv.</i> 2.5.13 Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.43.5	Relegated, not deported
3) Cercina	Sempronius Gracchus (2 B.C.)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 1.53.4, 4.13.3	Relegated, probably ordered to remain on Cercina (remained for 14 years)
4) Vienne	Archelaus of Judaea (A.D. 6)	Joseph. <i>AJ</i> 17.344 Strab. 16.2.46 Dio Cass. 55.27 Ov. <i>Tr.</i> 1.2.85	
5) Tomis	Ovid (A.D. 8)		Relegated, probably ordered to remain in Tomis (remained for nine years)
6) Crete	Cassius Severus (A.D. 12)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 1.72.4, 4.21.3 Dio Cass. 56.27.2–3	Relegated, not deported
7) Cos			Named by Augustus as permissible island for deported exiles (A.D. 12)
8) Rhodes		Dio Cass. 56.27.2–3	Named by Augustus as permissible island for deported exiles (A.D. 12)
9) Samos		Dio Cass. 56.27.2–3	Named by Augustus as permissible island for deported exiles (A.D. 12)
10) Lesbos		Dio Cass. 56.27.2–3	Named by Augustus as permissible island for deported exiles (A.D. 12)
11) Seriphos	Vistilia (A.D. 19)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 2.85.3	Woman of senatorial family
12) Cythnus	C. Julius Silanus (A.D. 22)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 3.69.5–6 Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 3.68.2	Proposed for C. Julius Silanus
13) Gyaros			
14) Amorgos	C. Vibius Serenus (A.D. 23)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.13.2	Moved here from Crete
15) Seriphos	Cassius Severus (A.D. 24)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.21.3	Having been hauled back to Rome to face a new charge, he was re-sentenced to Amorgos
16) Amorgos	C. Vibius Serenus (A.D. 24)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.30.1–2	Proposed for C. Vibius Serenus
17) Gyaros		Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.30.1	Proposed for C. Vibius Serenus
18) Donusa		Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.30.1	Proposed for C. Vibius Serenus
19) Massilia	son of exiled senator (A.D. 25)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 4.44.3	‘Sequestered’ but not banished

Table A1 – continued

Place of Exile	Deportee (date of exile)	Reference(s)	Notes
20) Lesbos	Junius Gallio (A.D. 32)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 6.3.3 Dio Cass. 58.18.3	Chose Lesbos himself, but was hauled back to Rome and imprisoned
21) Andros	A. Avilius Flaccus (A.D. 38/9)	Philo, <i>In Flacc.</i> 151	Original island to which Avilius Flaccus was assigned
22) Gyarus	Herod Antipas (A.D. 39)	Jos. <i>AJ</i> 18.252 <i>BJ</i> 2.183	<i>BJ</i> 2.183 says his exile was in Spain
23) Lugdunum			
24) Cinaria	Greek Xeno (Tiberian)	Suet. <i>Tib.</i> 56.1	
25) Corsica	Annaeus Seneca (A.D. 41)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 12.8.2, 13.42.2 Dio Cass. 60.8.5	Seneca mentions other exiles on this island
26) Balearic Islands	P. Suilius Rufus (A.D. 58)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 13.43.5	
27) Massilia	Faustus Cornelius Sulla Felix (A.D. 58)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 13.47.3, 14.57.4	Restricted to city
28) Sardinia	Anicetus (A.D. 62)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 14.62.4	False accuser of Octavia given special exile
29) Aegean Island	Cluvidienus Quietus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4	
30) Aegean Island	Julius Agrippa (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4	
31) Aegean Island	Blittus Catulinus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4	
32) Aegean Island	Petronius Priscus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4	
33) Aegean Island	Julius Altinus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4	
34) Gyarus	C. Musonius Rufus (A.D. 65)	Philostr. <i>VA</i> 7.16	He mentions another exile there
35) Andros	P. Glitius Gallus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4–5 <i>SLG</i> ³ 811/12	
36) Sardinia	C. Cassius Longinus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 16.9.1, <i>Dig.</i> 1.2.51	Very old senator, perhaps not expected to live long
37) Naxos	L. Junius Silanus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 16.9.1	Killed before departure
38) Sardinia	Rufrius Crispinus (A.D. 65)	Tac. <i>Ann.</i> 15.71.4, 16.17.2	Killed shortly after arrival on island